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US HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY

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Prepared for the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) under
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March 1981

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US HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY.

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US HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY

Introduction

The militia system of the United States, which was inherited from the colonies, has always had a dual purpose: first, availability to local colonial or state authorities to maintain order in times of internal crisis or disorder; second, availability to central authority (be it royal or federal) in times of war or grave national emergency. This militia system operated rather ineffectively for many years under the Militia Act of 1792; it was substantially revised and given a cohesive form under the Dick Act of 1903, which established the National Guard as the formal militia organization of the nation, and gave to the President the authority to call the National Guard to federal control in time of war or emergency.

As first became evident when much of the National Guard was called to active duty by President Wilson in 1916 for duty along the Mexican Border, the federalization of the National Guard removed from the control of the governors of the states the militia forces which were normally available to them for dealing with internal or local emergencies. And since the Constitution (Section 10) forbids the states to "keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace," there was no way in which the state governors could maintain or raise an alternative force to perform the local militia function before the National Guard was federalized. Indeed, if the National Guard should be called to active duty without a declaration of war (as was the case in 1916), the states could not even create an alternative or substitute force after the federalization of the National Guard, prior to a declaration of war. This meant that such federalization of the National Guard removed from state control a force capable of dealing with emergencies at the very time when the potential threat of sabotage, insurrection, or even invasion can seem, and even be, very real. As a result of experience in the Mexican Border crisis and since some states, particularly on the east and west coasts of the United States, have made plans between wars for a substitute force with some of the features of the National Guard. But the story of what has actually happened in the three wars in which some or all of the National Guard was called up -- World War I,

World War II, and the Korean War -- is largely characterized by action after the fact, complicated, from the point of view of the states' adjutants general, with what must have seemed slow response from the federal government.

This account of US experience with home defense forces in three wars is derived primarily from two types of sources: reports and correspondence of the National Guard Bureau and its predecessors, and reports of the adjutants general of the various states. A request for assistance from the current state adjutants general brought generous response and considerable helpful information.

This study was prepared by Thomas Tulenko, Bradley Chase, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Grace P. Hayes. ✓

CHAPTER I

US HOME DEFENSE IN WORLD WAR I

The mobilization and federalization of state National Guard units in 1916 and 1917 left the states largely without organized forces for home defense or internal security. These crises came after a period of labor strife that had been marked by strikes and confrontations of strikers and police in several areas of the United States. Anti-German feeling was running high, and fears of sabotage were very real. With National Guard troops no longer available for emergencies most of the states hastened to form some sort of organization to fill the gap.

There had been no adequate planning to deal with this situation, and although the Congress passed legislation to give some support to the state units, and the War Department issued advice and directives, the state bodies were never uniform in organization, function, or even in name. (Figure 1). Even their legality was in doubt until late in the war.

To avoid confusion in this survey, all units formed in World War I to provide the kinds of security provided in peacetime by the National Guard will be referred to as "home defense forces," although this term was not widely used at the time. The War Department generally used the designation, "Home Guards," but in fact, although this term was used in some states, it was not used in most, and those units that were so called differed in many respects from one another.¹

To understand the home defense forces of World War I it is necessary to review the legislation that defined the organization and function of the National Guard.

¹ On 19 July 1917 The Director of the Home Defense League suggested that the Home Defense Leagues that had been formed in the District of Columbia, New York, and Philadelphia be called the National Reserve Guard, since they were taking the place of the National Guard. The Chief of the Militia Bureau vetoed this idea, however, since it was not contemplated that the forces would be federalized, and he said that the formation and designation were entirely a state responsibility. Ltr, Director, Home Defense League, to SecWar, 19 July 1917; ltr, CMB to Director, Home Defense League, 23 July 1917.

Figure 1
HOME DEFENSE FORCES, WORLD WAR I

State	Name	Authorized by			
		Governor		Legislature	
		1917	1918	1917	1918
Alabama	--	-	-	-	-
Arizona	Loyalty League	-	-	X	-
Arkansas	(Home Guard)	X	-	-	-
California	State Defense Guard	-	-	X	-
Colorado	State Service	X	-	-	-
Connecticut	(Home Guard)	-	-	X	-
Delaware	Organized Militia	-	-	X	-
D. C.	--	no force		-	-
Florida	--	-	-	X	-
Georgia	State Guard	-	-	X	-
Idaho	--	no force		-	-
Illinois	Reserve Militia and volunteer training units	-	-	X	-
Indiana	--	X	-	-	-
Iowa	--	-	-	X	-
Kansas	State Guard	X	-	-	X
Kentucky	State Guard	-	-	X	-
Louisiana	Home Guard	-	-	X	-
Maine	Home Guard	-	-	X	-
Maryland	State Guard	-	-	X	-
Massachusetts	State Guard	-	-	X	-
Michigan	(Home Guard)	X	-	-	-
Minnesota	Home Guard	-	-	X	-
Mississippi	Home Guard	-	-	X	-
Missouri	Home Guard	X	-	-	-
Montana	--	no force		-	-
Nebraska	Home Guard	-	-	-	X
Nevada	--	no force		-	-
New Hampshire	State Guard	-	-	X	-
New Jersey	State Militia and State Reserve Militia	X	-	-	-
New Mexico	(Home Guard)	X	-	-	-
New York	New York Guard	-	-	X	-
North Carolina	Reserve Militia	-	-	X	-
North Dakota	--	-	-	-	-
Ohio	Home Guard	-	X	-	-
Oklahoma	(Home Guard)	X	-	-	-
Oregon	Oregon Guard	-	-	-	X
Pennsylvania	Reserve Militia	-	-	X	-
Rhode Island	State Guard	X	-	-	X
South Carolina	State Reserve Militia	-	-	X	-
South Dakota	Home Guard	X	-	-	X
Tennessee	NG reserve	X	-	X	-
Texas	Rangers	-	-	X	-
Utah	NG	-	X	-	-
Vermont	Volunteer Militia	-	-	X	-
Virginia	Virginia Volunteers	X	-	-	-
Washington	State Guard	X	-	-	-
West Virginia	Militia Reserves	-	-	-	X
Wisconsin	State Guard	X	-	-	-
Wyoming	Home Guard	-	X	-	-

The basic legislation was the Dick Act of 21 January 1903, which reorganized the federal militia system, for the first time since 1792. The act divided the militia into two groups, the organized militia, and the reserve militia. "The militia shall consist," it read

of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes -- the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective States or Territories, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia.
(Sec. 1. Act of 21 January 1903.)

The states were to reorganize their organized militia, whether or not actually designated National Guard, within five years, to conform with the organization of the Regular Army, and to hold prescribed drills and encampments, subject to Army inspection. In each state an Adjutant General (a state official) was to be appointed to head the militia and report to the Secretary of War in all matters concerning the federal relationship and responsibilities of the militia.

Most important for the home defense was Section 4, which provided

that whenever the United States is invaded, or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable, with the other forces at his command, to execute the laws of the Union in any part thereof, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth, for a period not exceeding nine months, such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officers of the militia as he may think proper.

The Dick Act was concerned primarily with federal assistance to National Guard units, and it made no specific provision for any state militia organization other than the organized militia or National Guard. However, in Section 23 provision was made for "securing a list of persons specially qualified to hold commissions in any volunteer force which may hereafter be called for and organized under the authority of Congress, other than a force composed of organized militia." This was clearly

referring to volunteers for federal service, that is, a reserve officer list. But it might equally apply to volunteers for state organizations.

In 1908 (27 May) the Dick Act was amended in several respects, on the basis of the experience acquired in the previous five years in carrying out the regulations of the earlier law. This Militia Act, as it has been called, focussed on providing equipment and training for organized militia units, improving their condition, and tightening federal control over them. Relevant to the question of home defense was a revision of Section 4, deleting the limitation of nine months on the period for which the President could call out the militia. The President might "specify in his call the period for which such service is required, and the militia so called [should] continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory of the United States."

The Militia Act created a supervisory body, providing that

the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to appoint a board of five officers on the active list of the organized militia so selected as to secure, as far as practicable, equitable representation to all sections of the United States, and which shall from time to time, as the Secretary of War may direct, proceed to Washington, District of Columbia, for consultation with the Secretary of War respecting the condition, status, and needs of the whole body of the organized militia. Such officers shall be appointed for the term of four years unless sooner relieved by the Secretary of War." (Sec. 20, Act of 27 May 1908.)

Within the War Department a Division of Militia Affairs was established to handle matters relating to the organized militia. It subsequently became the Militia Bureau and was put under the General Staff.

The years 1980-1916, as R. Ernest Dupuy, historian of the National Guard has written, were the "peacetime heyday" of that organization.² Most units were housed in comfortable armories, where a clublike atmosphere prevailed. Once these units left for the Great War the state forces that replaced them inherited the spirit as well as the buildings of the departed units.

² R. Ernest Dupuy, *The National Guard* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971), pp. 95-96.

The flaming of world war in Europe in 1914, with the possibility of US involvement on the minds of all Americans, plus the troubled situation on the southwestern border with Mexico (a situation that was to lead to calling out the National Guard in mid-1916), made it clear to the administrations of Woodrow Wilson, to the Congress, and to many outside the government, that the improved and enlarged Army of the post-Spanish War period, even with the augmented and strengthened National Guard, would be totally inadequate for the future. There was heated debate between those who thought further expansion should be achieved by increasing the National Guard, on the one hand, and proponents of a large Federal Reserve force, on the other. This led on 3 June 1916 to the most comprehensive military legislation produced by the Congress up to that time: the National Defense Act of 1916. This act, with its detailed provisions for the organization and operations of the Army, provided a real basis for the development of the kind of modern armed strength required by a world power. It contained many provisions related to the militia.

In the first place the act provided

that the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and other such land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law.
(Sec. 1, Act of 3 June 1916)

When not called to federal service, of course, the National Guard was a part of the militia, as earlier provided by the Dick Act. The new law read:

The militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be more than eighteen years of age and except as hereinafter provided, not more than forty-five years of age, and said militia shall be divided into three classes, the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and the Unorganized Militia.
(Sec. 57, Act of 3 June 1916.)

The extensive provisions relating to the National Guard are not germane to this study. However, the Act included some provisions that did concern forces for home defense. Maintenance of such troops in peacetime was specifically forbidden by Section 61, which, echoing the Constitution's provision that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace," read:

No State shall maintain troops in time of peace other than as authorized in accordance with the organization prescribed under this Act: *Provided*, That nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as limiting the rights of the States and Territories in the use of the National Guard within their respective borders in time of peace: *Provided further*, That nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the organization and maintenance of State Police or constabulary.
(Sec. 61, Act of 3 June 1916.)

For the first time in US history the act recognized the need for some action within the states in the event the National Guard was federalized. In the first place it provided for organization of a National Guard Reserve in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia, to "consist of such organizations, officers, and enlisted men as the President may prescribe, or members thereof may be assigned as reserves to an active organization of the National Guard." This would be part of the source of a substitute for the mobilized National Guard, in accordance with Section 79:

When members of the National Guard and the enlisted service thereof of any State, Territory, or District of Columbia shall have been brought into the service of the United States in time of war, there shall be immediately organized, either from such enlisted reserve or from the unorganized militia, in such State, Territory, or District, one reserve battalion for each regiment of Infantry or Cavalry, or each nine batteries of Field Artillery, or each twelve companies of Coast Artillery, brought into the service of the United States, and such reserve battalion shall constitute the fourth battalion of any such regiment or twelve companies of Coast Artillery. Reserve battalions shall consist of four companies of such strength as may be prescribed by the President of the United States. When the members of three or more regiments of the National Guard of any State, Territory, or District shall have been brought into the service of the United States, the reserve battalions of such regiments may be organized into provisional regiments and higher units. If for any reason there shall not be enough voluntary enlistments to keep the reserve battalions at the prescribed strength, a

sufficient number of the unorganized militia shall be drafted into the service of the United States to maintain each of such battalions at the proper strength. As vacancies occur from death or other causes in any organization in the service of the United States and composed of men taken from the National Guard, men shall be transferred from the reserve battalions to the organizations in the field so that such organizations shall be maintained at war strength. Officers for the reserve battalions provided for herein shall be drafted from the National Guard Reserve or Coast Artillery companies of the National Guard or the Officers' Reserve Corps, such officers to be taken, if practicable, from the States, respectively, in which the battalions shall be organized. Officers and non-commissioned officers returned to their home stations because of their inability to perform active field service may be assigned to reserve battalions for duty, and all soldiers invalided home shall be assigned to and carried on the rolls of reserve battalions until returned to duty or until discharged.

Fifteen days after passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 President Wilson called up the National Guard to assist the Regular Army during the crisis on the Mexican border. The states, forbidden by the Act to maintain troops other than police or constabulary in time of peace, had had little time to organize the reserve the Act had called for.

Meanwhile, tension between the United States and Germany was rising, and in many states the necessity for some sort of local defense force in addition to the authorized police and constabulary became apparent, largely to deal with the possibility of sabotage or subversion. In rural areas of the Midwest and West rifle and shotgun clubs organized themselves into ad hoc militia companies, to the extent that in January 1917 Charles Blauvelt, publisher of the *Johnson County Journal* in Nebraska, informed the Office of the Adjutant General in Washington that 400 men of various ages, comprising five companies, had been organized in Johnson County. Although he could boast about their patriotic zeal, he reported that they were ill-equipped, poorly trained, and inclined to act independently of one another. He sought authority to form a cohesive group.³ In the East mayors, businessmen, and professionals formed Committees for Public Safety, Home Defense Leagues, or Liberty Leagues and met to devise ways

³ Letter, Charles D. Blauvelt to Adjutant General, 2 January 1917.

to reinforce police force, fire departments, and watchmen in order to protect such facilities as light and power plants and water supplies. In New Jersey, for example, the mayors of the large cities met with the governor in March 1917 and decided that the municipalities would organize "home guards" like military units, with uniforms, arms, and equipment. They would be funded by individual members, community contributions, and the city coffers. In time, 84 cities in New Jersey formed such units.

On 29 August 1916 Congress established the National Council of Defense, composed of six cabinet members, the secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, Navy, and War, and an advisory committee of six experts from the business world. Its chief function was to promote cooperation between industry and the military in planning and preparing for mobilization in the event of war.

Once the President broke diplomatic relations with Germany, on 5 February 1917, interest in home defense quickly spread from the local to the state level. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania created state Committees of Public Safety; New York set up a Resource Mobilization Bureau under the state attorney general. As these organizations and other state bodies appealed to the National Council of Defense for assistance, the Council's Advisory Committee on 23 March agreed "that a definite and comprehensive policy [should] be adopted which will enable this Commission to cooperate with the people of the several states, toward the coordination of the activities of local preparedness and defense." ⁴

Meanwhile National Guard units were returning from the Mexican border. Some of them, including part of the Illinois National Guard, were back on active duty (at the call of the Governor) almost as soon as they were mustered out, even before the declaration of war. All National Guard units were advised by the War Department on 18 May 1917 to prepare for a call, and on 5 August they were all drafted into federal service by Presidential proclamation. In response to requests from several states for federal troops to protect sensitive installations, the War Department informed the various adjutants general that, in order not to curtail training

⁴ Frederick Lewis Allen, "The Council of Defense System." May 1919. MS., p.5.

of federalized National Guard troops, municipal and state authorities would be expected to provide necessary protection for important industries and resources themselves.

The Secretary of War did take special measures to protect federal installations in the states, creating a special body of U.S. Guards as part of the National Army in May 1917, charged with observing the conduct of alien enemies and protecting shipyards, supply depots, and other major war-related installations. Enlisted men for the U.S. Guards were secured by transfer of men unfit for duty abroad but suitable for stateside service, and by voluntary enlistments of men above draft age. Officers were selected by examination.⁵ Organization of the U.S. Guard was started on 22 December 1917, was suspended on 8 January 1918, provisions of the establishing directive were modified, and organization of new units was resumed on 15 April 1918. A total of 48 battalions were formed, and four additional officers were designated for detail to the US Shipping Board, a total of 1,216 officers and 25,068 enlisted men.

Many states, particularly those on the east coast, had foreseen the problems of replacing the protection afforded by their National Guard units and had taken steps to form some sort of home defense force or to pass necessary enabling legislation. Anticipating problems with unfriendly foreign residents, labor unrest, or, later, draft evaders and draft dodgers, in addition to the normal demands of law and order, some states concentrated on increasing their state police and constabularies. Others, fearing for the safety of private property -- notably war-related industries, sensitive because of the war -- waterfront areas, and utilities subject to potential sabotage, felt the need to replace the federalized National Guard with a similar military (as opposed to police or constabulary) organization, or to organize National Guard reserve units.

Providing uniforms and weapons for these new state organizations was a problem, both because of the expense and because the federal government was so depleting stocks, and placing such demands on production facilities,

⁵ G.O. 162, 22 December 1917. Letter, AGO to CG, Northeastern Department, 2 May 1918; Annual Report, SecWar, 1918-1919, pp. 18-19.

that it was very difficult for the states to procure them. In order to enable the Secretary of War to provide equipment and to maintain some sort of control over state organizations, the Congress passed, and on 14 June 1917 the President approved, what became known as the Home Guard Act, quoted below in its entirety.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of War during this existing emergency be, and he is hereby, authorized, in his discretion, to issue from time to time to the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia for the equipment of such home guards having the character of State police or constabulary as may be organized under the direction of the governors of the several States and Territories and the commissioners of the District of Columbia or other State troops or militia, such rifles and ammunition therefor, cartridge belts, haversacks, canteens, in limited amounts as available supplies will permit, provided that the property so issued shall remain the property of the United States and shall be receipted for by the governors of the several States and Territories and Commissioners of the District of Columbia and accounted for by them under such regulations and upon furnishing such bonds or security as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and that any property so issued shall be returned to the United States on demand when no longer needed for the purposes for which issued, or if, in the judgment of the Secretary of War, an exigency requires the use of the property for Federal purposes: Provided, That all home guards, State troops and militia receiving arms and equipments as herein provided shall have the use, in the discretion of the Secretary of War and under such regulations as he may prescribe, of rifle ranges owned or controlled by the United States of America.

Although this seemed to recognize the legality of state troops during wartime, whether or not states actually had the authority to create them in wartime was not entirely clear, and after a number of states had made inquiries about it and about whether such bodies of troops might be subject to call up by the federal government, on 13 October 1917 the Acting Judge Advocate General issued an opinion that "a state may . . . in time of war maintain forces resembling the army of the United States whose functions . . . are much more restricted," adding that "whatever the character of such forces, . . . they are capable of being called by the nation into the service of the U.S. militia for the usual constitutional purposes." This was hardly

reassuring, but on 27 March 1918 the Chief of the Militia Bureau reassured the states that guard units raised during the war would not be called "for service beyond the seas."

By mid-1918 the question of forming new National Guard units that would be recognized as such by the federal government to replace those that had been federalized the year before had become an important one in several states. Consequently, on 4 May 1918 the Chief of the Militia Bureau informed the state adjutants general that since the entire National Guard had been federalized, and thereby discharged from the militia, "the States [were] now at liberty to organize anew a National Guard force under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved June 3, 1916."⁶ It was made clear that forces so organized would have to meet certain requirements, in order to be recognized and qualify for federal support.

As the war progressed, each state provided its own solutions to the problems of protecting property and meeting emergencies for which in time of peace National Guard troops had been available. Almost all of them made some move that would increase police or constabulary forces; some organized forces on a military basis and maintained them under state control; some were organized on a purely local basis with no state organization; and others formed National Guard reserve units. The variations were described in a letter from the Chief of the Militia Bureau to Congressman Hubert S. Dent, Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, on 22 May 1918.

In the majority of the states, if not all, numerous bodies of citizens have been formed, on a military or quasi-military basis, for local defense purposes. Certain of these have been given a legal status under the laws of the states, are sworn to obey the orders of the governor, and are either a duly constituted state constabulary, or are in all respects similar, if not identical, with the militia as it existed prior to the Dick Bill, the primary purpose of which is to maintain local order when occasion shall arise for their use. Other of these forces are entirely voluntary civilian units, who stand ready and willing to assist local peace officers in time of civil disturbance but have no obligation to the state of a military character. These various bodies of state "militia" are given the general designation "Home Guards," are

⁶ Letter, Chief, Militia Bureau, to the Adjutants General of all States, Territories and the District of Columbia, 4 May 1918.

not recognized, and have no legal status under the Act of Congress approved 3 June 1916, except as a local state force.

It is assumed that under Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1910 (which is not in conflict with any provision of the Act of June 3, 1916), the President would have the power to call upon such bodies of citizens in their capacity as "militia" for the specified constitutional purposes. Otherwise, the federal government has no control or jurisdiction over Home Guard organizations.

The one area in which the federal government could assist the state defense forces was by providing weapons and equipment as authorized by the Home Guard Act. In December 1917, the situation concerning authorized forces that could apply for such support was as shown in Figure 2.

The difficulty of grouping the various types of home defense forces in the 48 states in World War I is amply illustrated by an attempt by the Council of Defense in February 1918, on the basis of reports received from the states, to divide the forces of "Home Guards and similar bodies" known to exist at that time in five categories: "the strict state constabularies; second, Home Guards primarily for police duty which are approved of; third, Home Guards of the military type which are not approved of; fourth, forces of special constables, and fifth, a State secret service body." ⁷

In general, state constabularies exercised all or most police functions. Home Guards were described as "a comparatively small body of men . . . to meet the situation caused by the withdrawal of the National Guard, which was formerly available for strike duty, . . . which will have sufficient training and discipline to handle instances of domestic violence and yet will be in the nature of a volunteer organization." The "Home Guards of the military type" were described as "in a sense a substitute militia taking the place of the National Guard which has been drafted into the Federal service." The fourth category, special constables, were described as "peace officers appointed by the Governor or sheriff for special duty." The secret service bodies were used primarily to enforce selective service and prohibition legislation. Three states -- Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania -- were shown as having the first

⁷ Encl. to letter Louis W. McKernan, Council of National Defense, to BGen J. McI. McCarter, Chief, Militia Bureau, 9 February 1918.

Figure 2
HOME DEFENSE FORCES AS OF 14 DECEMBER 1917*

State	Authorized by state legislature	Unauthorized
Alabama	none	none
Arizona	500 Sp'f'd rifles furnished: 200 in possession of state AG; 200 in Loyalty League	Loyalty League
Arkansas	none	52 companies
California	none	5,000
Colorado	200	Units in several counties
Connecticut	10,000 armed by state	4,000
Delaware	none	none
D.C.	none	none
Florida	1,000	none
Georgia	none	Units in several counties
Idaho	none	none
Illinois	5,000 armed by state	none
Indiana	none	none
Iowa	none	none
Kansas	7,500	none
Kentucky	none	none
Louisiana	none	none
Maine	none	none
Maryland	none	none
Massachusetts	10,000 armed by state	none
Michigan	6,000 (2,000 armed by state)	none
Minnesota	4,000 armed by federal government	none
Mississippi	none	none
Montana	none	none
Nebraska	none	"Large No.!"
New Hampshire	1 regiment armed by state	none
New Jersey	10,000	none
New Mexico	none	none
New York	10,000 armed by state	none
North Carolina	5,000	none
North Dakota	no report	-
Ohio	none	a few
Oklahoma	none	25 companies
Oregon	none	2 regiments
Pennsylvania	5,000	none
Rhode Island	10,000 armed by state	none
South Carolina	none	none
South Dakota	none	a few
Tennessee	none	none
Texas	120 Rangers armed by state	none
Utah	3 companies	none
Vermont	600	none
Virginia	1,500	none
Washington	no report	-
West Virginia	150	none
Wisconsin	2,500	none
Wyoming	4 companies	none

* Memo Chief, Militia Bureau, to General Babbitt, "Report from States on Home Guard Units," 14 December 1917.

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category; 28 states -- Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin -- were shown with the second category, "Home Guard Proper;" five -- Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington -- were in the category of "Military Home Guards;" seven -- Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia -- were listed as having "Volunteer Constables and Special Police;" and Iowa and New York were shown as having secret service units.

Although this document appears to categorize the forces rather neatly, the explanatory material makes it immediately evident that those in any of the categories were dissimilar in many respects. The entire document is attached as Appendix A. No similar document for a later date was found, and there is no evidence that these categories were used for any significant purpose. In a contemporary document listing arms requirements by states (Figure 3) there is no distinction by types of forces. It seems probable that all met the requirements of the Home Guard Act.

The Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1918-1919 indicates that by the end of the war the number and nature of the state home defense forces had changed considerably. According to information available to the Militia Bureau, the following forces "were in existence and had been partially armed and equipped for state use" under authority of the Home Guard Act:

Arkansas

63 companies home guard (50 to 100 each) 1 platoon of 30 men

California

100 companies home guard

Connecticut

home guard (6,000 officers and men)

Delaware

1 company Infantry with supply detachment

Florida

home guards in 34 towns

Figure 3

ARMS REQUIREMENTS, 5 FEBRUARY 1918*

States	Arms Needed	On Hand	Requirements
Alabama	No forces	-	-
Arizona	No forces	-	-
Arkansas	650	-	-
California	3,600	-	-
Colorado	818	200	-
Connecticut	2,000	2,000	-
Delaware	200	-	-
Florida	No forces	-	-
Georgia	No report	-	-
Idaho	No forces	-	-
Illinois	No report	-	-
Indiana	1,800	1,600	-
Iowa	No report	-	-
Kansas	No forces	-	-
Kentucky	No forces	-	-
Louisiana	No report	-	-
Maine	No report	-	-
Maryland	No forces	-	-
Massachusetts	10,000	10,000	-
Michigan	5,700	2,000	-
Minnesota	3,160	720	-
Mississippi	No report	-	-
Missouri	No report	-	-
Montana	No forces	-	-
Nebraska	Stren. not stated	-	-
Nevada	No report	-	-
New Hampshire	1,800	1,880	-
New Jersey	12,880	9,660	-
New Mexico	No forces	-	-
New York	21,000	12,000	-
North Carolina	5,000	5,000	-
North Dakota	No forces	-	-
Ohio	No forces	-	-
Oklahoma	No report	-	-
Oregon	2,065	-	-
Pennsylvania	5,640	-	-
Rhode Island			
South Carolina	No report	-	-
South Dakota	No forces	-	-
Tennessee	No forces	-	-
Texas	No forces	-	-
Utah	No forces	-	-
Vermont	600	600	-
Virginia	1,400	-	-
Washington	2,400	2,400	-
West Virginia	5,600	5,600	-
Wisconsin	2,600	300	-
Wyoming	No forces	-	-
District of Columbia	No forces	-	-
Total	89,913	60,480	29,433

* From Memo G.H. Dorr, Office of Ast. Sec. War to Chief. Military Bureau,
5 February 1918.

Georgia

21 companies State Guard (75 men per company)

Indiana

37 companies Infantry

Kansas

49 battalions and 60 separate companies, State guards.

Maryland

1 regiment (2d Infantry) State Guard.

Massachusetts

2 brigades (4 regiments Infantry each), 1 brigade (3 regiments Infantry), 1 motor corps, 1 troop cavalry, 1 ambulance company and 1 military emergency hospital.

Michigan

2 companies (2 mounted), 3 regiments Infantry, 2 battalions Infantry and 25 separate companies Infantry.

Minnesota

Motor corps (10 battalions), 21 battalions home guards.

New Hampshire

1 regiment Infantry, State Guard.

New Jersey

State militia, staff corps and depots, 7 battalions and 2 separate companies Infantry; State militia reserve, 17 battalions Infantry and 36 separate companies.

New Mexico

7 companies home guard.

New York

1 regiment Engineers, 1 battalion Signal Corps, 4 squadrons Cavalry, 2 field hospitals, 2 ambulance companies, 40 Coast Artillery Corps companies, 2 regiments Field Artillery, 15 regiments and 2 battalions Infantry.

North Carolina

53 companies reserve militia (average 64 men each).

Ohio

50 companies home guards.

Pennsylvania

3 regiments Infantry, 12 lettered companies each, machine gun detachment, sanitary detachment and band for each regiment, and squadron of Cavalry (4 troops).

Rhode Island

18 companies State guards (100 men each), headquarters and supply company, machine-gun detachment and sanitary detachment.

South Carolina

1 regiment reserve militia and 1 additional battalion.

South Dakota

100 companies home guards.

Vermont

1 regiment Infantry.

Virginia

8 companies Infantry and 20 separate companies (home and State guards).

West Virginia

3 companies militia reserve.

Wisconsin

State guard: 4 regiments Infantry; state guard reserve;
1 separate battalion, 38 separate companies and 6 separate platoons.

The total number of men in these units was not known to the Militia Bureau, which estimated them to have been not more than 79,000, undoubtedly on the basis of the number of arms that had been issued to the states for home defense purposes, a total of 78,008. An effort to aggregate strengths from various state reports for this study was unsuccessful, because of a lack of consistent data. From data that is available, including the figures on arms requirements shown in Figure 2, it is apparent that the total number of all troops mustered for home defense, and even those qualifying for federal equipment, must have been considerably larger, since many units were equipped at state or personal expense. Nonetheless, the figure of 79,000 has been generally used in reference to home defense force strengths in World War I.

The similarities and the differences among the home defense forces of World War I can best be described by stating briefly what has been learned about each of them. There is no consistency in the available in the Washington area (Federal Records Center, Library of Congress, National Guard Bureau) or in the reports received in response to inquiries of the various state adjutant generals. From a variety of sources the forces are summarized.

Alabama

There were no military organizations.

Arizona

Home Guards and rifle clubs were organized on a local basis, the leader deputized by the sheriff. No information is available concerning a reported reorganization by the Committee on Public Defense.

Arkansas

Home Guards were actually vigilance committees. There were about 60 companies, 18 of them armed by the state, the rest uniformed and armed at their own expense.

California

The Governor and adjutant general headed a State Defense Guard of men 30-50 years of age. Originally ten companies were authorized. Later there were about 100. They had duties of a constabulary and such other duties as the governor might direct, but could not be used in industrial disputes. They were self-armed or armed by local authorities.

Colorado

Five companies, A, B, and C of the Third Regiment and A and B of Colored Infantry, were organized in the early summer of 1917. They were called into active service for guard duty on public utilities and reservoir projects on 1 August. Additional companies were recruited as necessary. The largest total of men on active duty was 409 in September 1917, the smallest 168 in October 1918. These units were organized and paid like National Guard troops, but were under state command. After the war, late in 1918, the 3d Colorado Infantry and Troop "A" of the Colorado Cavalry received Federal recognition as National Guard units.

Connecticut

The Home Guard, equipped and uniformed by the state, had constabulary duties and such others as the governor and the Military Emergency Board directed. There were 9,000 men plus a reserve of 4,000. Details of the organization are not available.

Delaware

On 7 April 1917 the state adjutant general, under provisions of state law and a joint resolution of the state senate, set up the Organized Militia of Delaware for home defense, calling for enlistment of men 45-55 years of age, or with previous federal service and no longer eligible for it. On 21 December eligibility was extended to "able-bodied citizens between the ages of 21 and 55 years." Although three companies of infantry with supply and sanitary detachments were authorized, only one company was actually formed. It was officially recognized by the governor on 4 February 1918. As of 15 March 1918 that company had 3 officers and 42 men, neither equipped nor uniformed by the state. On 27 January 1919 there were 4 officers and 71 men.

Florida

Local groups of home guards, presumably constabulary in nature, were formed in 34 towns.

Georgia

Fifteen companies of State Guard, comprising 65 officers, 1,184 men, and 12 women were mustered into state service in 1918.⁸ The women were members of a motor company in Atlanta. This was a military organization, under the state adjutant general. The state provided training manuals, some weapons, and 600 overcoats, the federal government provided 2,440 Russian rifles, and each company provided its own clothing. Members also apparently brought their own arms on occasion. Various units were called out by local authorities for riot control on four occasions during 1918.

⁸ Fifteen companies are listed by name (Dublin Guard, Dorsey Rifles, etc.) in the report of the Acting Adjutant General of Georgia covering the period 1 January 1918 to 28 February 1919, with the indication that there were no state troops at the beginning of 1918. It may perhaps be assumed that the additional six companies shown in the report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau quoted above were formed after February 1919 or were not recognized by the state adjutant general.

Idaho

The governor ordered formation of four companies of Home Guard, with 100 men per company, paid for by the state.

Illinois

Even before the National Guard was called to federal service, the governor ordered establishment of a brigade of three infantry regiments (9th, 10th, and 11th) of National Guard for service in the state. They were mustered into state service in July 1917. In addition, Volunteer Training Units were set up under the State Council of Defense. On 25 June 1917 legislation was signed providing for organization of the Reserve Militia. A call for 6,000 volunteers was issued on 19 September and a second call for 11,000 more on 4 March 1918. By 9 November 1918 there were 8 regiments of Reserve Militia, plus 1 separate battalion, and 38 separate companies, organized in two brigades, with some 475 officers and 7,000 enlisted men. Many of them came from the Volunteer Training Units. And many were drafted into federal service, where the training they had received in Illinois aided them in getting noncomm status. Training in fact seems to have been the primary function of the Reserve Militia.

Although report of the state adjutant general for the period 1 October 1916 to 30 September 1918 (which is the source of this information) does not indicate, it seems likely that the eight regiments of Reserve Militia in fact represented the reserve battalions for the eight regiments of the Illinois National Guard that were called into federal service.

No record was found of any active duty performed by the Reserve Militia or the Volunteer Training Units, which seem to have been unorganized local groups. The four calls for riot control reported after the departure of the original National Guard regiments were answered by units of the 9th or 10th National Guard regiments that were in the service of the state.

Indiana

The governor had authority to call out unorganized militia, and he used it to form 37 companies, whose function appears to have been constabulary. They were to be mustered out after the peace treaty was signed.

Iowa

The only local defense forces were special police officers selected by the governor or the attorney general.

Kansas

Starting with organization of a Home Guard in Kansas City under the governor's order of 5 August 1917, over 125 companies had been recruited in various localities by mid-February of 1918. At that time the Home Guard was dissolved, and reorganized as the Kansas State Guard. By the end of the war there were approximately 10,000 men enlisted in the State Guard.

Upon receipt of authorization from the Militia Bureau to form new National Guard units, the state adjutant general set in motion procedures for recruiting a new regiment, the Fourth Infantry, National Guard.

Kentucky

Four infantry companies of State Guard were formed to replace the National Guard, "for emergencies that might arise in the State requiring the use of military forces to enforce law and order." No record of what use it was called on for has been found.

Louisiana

A Home Guard with the powers of constables or police was set up, under the governor, to be called out upon request of parochial or municipal authorities.

Maine

The Home Guard, with all the powers of constables, police officers, and watchmen, except for the serving of civil processes, was to serve "at the call of the Governor when required for the public safety." Two other groups were called for in time of war, one the equivalent of a special police force, the other special deputy sheriffs.

Maryland

A State Guard was headed by the governor. It was organized in one regiment, with nine infantry companies and a machine gun company, the last stationed in Baltimore, the others in Baltimore, Hagerstown, Frederick, and Annapolis. In mid-March 1918 there were 34 officers and 518 men, companies

A through F and the machine gun company were uniformed and equipped with Springfield .45 cal. rifles, companies K and L were neither equipped nor uniformed, and Company M was partially equipped and partially uniformed.

Massachusetts

As early as 22 March 1917 the governor called for authority to form a Home Guard, authority which he received from the Legislature on 5 April. He promptly appointed a State Guard Board, "to organize, enlist and equip the Guard under the Home Guard act." On 24 August this board was dissolved and a military council replaced it, charged with determining "the policies of the land forces of the Commonwealth." The name Home Guard was changed to State Guard by the Legislature in May 1918.

Thus when the National Guard was federalized on 5 August the machinery was ready, and the State Guard was organized as a division two days later. At first requirements for enlistment were age 35. The age limit was dropped to 18 later. By the end of the year there were approximately 725 officers and 10,800 enlisted men, a size that was maintained for the rest of the war. They were organized in two brigades of four infantry regiments each, one brigade of three, one motor corps, one troop of cavalry, one ambulance company and an emergency hospital.

Like the men of Illinois, many of the men who served in the Massachusetts State Guard profitted from their training when drafted and promptly became non-commissioned officers. Drills were held at least weekly, and periodic inspections checked upon appearance and efficiency. Uniforms and weapons were provided by the state.

The State Guard of Massachusetts was called upon at the time of the disaster at Halifax, 6 December 1917, and promptly sent a detail including 10 surgeons, 10 civilian nurses, a civilian anesthetist, and 2 quartermaster officers. Two companies were detailed to guard the waterfront in Charlestown and East Boston in December 1917, until they were relieved by US Army units. The Guards were active also in promoting Liberty Loan bonds, and participating in parades, both activities common to several other states' home defense units. The company based in Easthampton was called out to quell a riot. And starting in September 1917 the Guard assisted in many ways in the flu epidemic, from establishing an emergency field hospital in Brookline to furnishing supplies, transporting doctors and nurses from patient to patient, and "performing the duties of camp guard, orderlies, and . . . nurses."

Michigan

A Home Guard, under the Secretary of the State War Preparedness Board, supplemented the permanent force of state troops -- nine officers and 50 men -- in the state constabulary. The Home Guard, which was authorized by the governor, apparently without legislative authority, included 7,500 men in 110 companies by February 1918. No information has been found concerning the forces described in the Adjutant General's report of 1919.

Minnesota

The Minnesota Home Guard was formed under the Public Safety Commission on 28 April 1917. It absorbed many of the independent companies like the Citizens' Training Corps in Duluth, which had been primarily training units. The Home Guard was organized according to the regulations for the National Guard, and it was under the control of the governor. It was open to "able-bodied men over twenty-six years of age." Eventually 23 battalions were formed, with more than 8,000 officers and men.

The Minnesota Motor Reserve was started unofficially by a Minneapolis car dealer in the summer of 1917, with each member "pledged to place himself and his car at the disposal of the government in any emergency." Some time in 1918 as a corps it became part of the Home Guard, with a complement of 143 officers and 2,400 men, formed in 10 battalions. Subsequently (date unknown) the three infantry regiments and the motor corps were accepted as National Guard units.

The three infantry regiments of the Home Guard served as guards at mines, ore docks, factories, bridges, and other points. The Guard was called out to assist in rescue operations after a tornado in August 1918 and during a forest fire in October.

Mississippi

A force composed of men between 18 and 60 was set up under the governor, with powers of sheriffs, constables, and police, except for serving civil processes. It was "to be used to suppress tumult, insurrection and riot." Whether or not it was so used is not known.

Missouri

Established by executive order on 17 July 1917 the Missouri Home Guard was organized in counties and townships under the State Council of Defense. There were 5 regiments of infantry, 6 separate battalions of infantry, 16 companies of infantry, and a troop of cavalry, with a total strength of over 6,000 men. In April 1918 the 2d Infantry Regiment, Missouri Home Guard, was reorganized and given federal recognition as the 7th Missouri Infantry, National Guard.

The Home Guard was outfitted by local communities or by the men themselves. The federal government finally provided enough rifles for about half the troops. Like many others, this organization provided pre-induction training for many who were eventually drafted. In April 1918 the Home Guards was called out to control strikers and rioters in Kansas City. Otherwise the Home Guard was available to provide police protection, and helped stimulate support for the war effort.

Montana

There was no legal military organization.

Nebraska

On 8 April 1917 the state legislature authorized organization of Home Guard companies. They were formed at county level and then reorganized by the governor. Organized in a brigade, the Home Guard was empowered to "perform such duties as the commander-in-chief [of the National Guards] may direct, and while in active service shall possess and exercise all powers of constables, policemen, and peace officers throughout the state, except in the service of civil process." County units were equipped at the expense of each county. A total of 390 companies were organized. In time some 60,000 Home Guards were organized, some of them well equipped, others not at all.

New Hampshire

A single regiment of infantry was formed as a State Guard, under legislation passed in 1917. In January 1919 the strength was reported as 57 officers and 938 enlisted men.

New Jersey

A State Militia was authorized on 22 March 1917, "for the purpose of meeting any emergency and to suppress riot or disorder which might arise within the State beyond the power of the local authorities to quell." Eventually 36 infantry companies, two machine gun companies, and seven bands were organized, in seven battalions under the control of the governor with at least one company and one platoon in each county, and a strength of over 3,250 officers and men. Male citizens between 21 and 45 were eligible. Uniforms were short, but weapons were provided by the federal government. The State Militia served as a training unit for future draftees, but more importantly was available for performing functions for which federal troops were not available.

In addition to the State Militia, a Committee of Public Safety, set up early in 1917, sponsored the formation of Home Guards in many cities. Locally uniformed and equipped, these Home Guards were organized as military units, to reenforce the efforts of local police, firemen, and watchmen. In 1918, these units, already recognized by the governor as State Militia Reserves, were made legitimate by an act of the state legislature, which authorized the establishment of a State Militia Reserve. By 30 June 1918 84 units of the Home Guard had been recognized as units of the Militia Reserve, with a strength of 6,420 men. In January 1919 there were 17 battalions of infantry and 36 separate companies, with a total strength of 8,000.

New Mexico

A home guard of seven companies was formed, but nothing more is known of it.

New York

The New York Guard was organized at some time in 1917 by the Adjutant General. On 11 December 1917 the Adjutant General created from it and activated a Provisional Brigade of two regiments. One was given the mission of guarding the water supply of New York City. The other was charged with guarding public buildings, railroad bridges, and some commercial plants from Troy and Albany to Niagara Falls. The costs were paid by the various private corporations and businesses involved. The Guard also apprehended draft evaders.

In 1918 the governor also authorized establishment of the Home Defense Corps, later known as the Home Defense Reserve of New York State, an auxiliary police reserve, organized in 338 companies as an addition to local police. They were equipped and maintained by voluntary contributions or by local communities and went out of existence soon after the Armistice.

North Carolina

A Reserve Militia was authorized by a law dated 7 March 1917. Fifty-three companies were formed, with a total of about 5,000 men. The War Department furnished 2,307 rifles, which were issued to 42 of the companies. Some of the others were purchased by the cities in which the companies were stationed. The duties of the Reserve Militia were primarily constabulary, but nothing is known of any specific use made of it.

North Dakota

The only force formed was a special police force under the Council of Defense.

Ohio

Upon departure of the National Guard, 120 companies of Home Guard were organized in cities and towns, their only authority provided by having individual members appointed policemen or deputy sheriffs. The organizations in some cities, including Cincinnati, Columbus, Akron, Canton, Toledo, and Dayton, were the size of regiments and were so organized. Many of the companies were well trained; others had little or no training. Uniforms and equipment were provided by the members themselves or their communities. On 19 October 1918, in order to obtain rifles and other equipment from the federal government, the governor officially recognized the Home Guard units in a proclamation that called forth "such portion of the State Militia as may be necessary" to form an organization to be known as the Ohio Home Guard, organized, trained, and disciplined like the Ohio National Guard, but entirely under control of the governor. In the few weeks before the Armistice the state received some rifles and other supplies.

Oklahoma

A Home Guard with police function was established by the State Council.

Oregon

A series of County Defense forces was set up in the summer of 1917, primarily local vigilante organizations that had been set up in many places and that achieved status by being deputized by County Sheriffs. Although these were county organizations with no state military status, 2,000 Springfield rifles and 50,000 rounds of ammunition were borrowed for them from the federal government.

In November 1917 the State Attorney General rendered a decision that the governor had authority to call into state service any portion of the unorganized militia, and use funds appropriated for the National Guard for maintaining it. Accordingly, on 19 November a battalion of men, most of them veterans of the Spanish-American War, which had been tentatively organized in July, was mustered into service as State Militia.

When a detachment of state militia had to be called out to protect industrial installations in Portland it was apparent that more troops under state control were needed. Consequently some of the County Defense units were mustered in as state militia, although the state was not responsible for any major expenses. These troops, known as the Oregon Guard, amounted to 35 companies.

In April 1918 still another militia force was set up in Oregon. Since late January 100 men and 2 officers of the State Militia had been on guard duty on the Portland waterfront. At the recommendation of the State Council of Defense the Oregon Military Police was established, with 235 men, primarily to relieve the militia of guard duty in Portland and to enforce law and order. Legally this was considered State Militia.

For administrative purposes on 18 October 1918 the State Militia was organized in a brigade with 36 tactical units grouped in regiments.

Pennsylvania

On 22 June 1917 a reserve militia was established, to consist of not more than three regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry. In addition to this military home guard, the governor was authorized to commission volunteer police officers.

Rhode Island

There were already in existence eight units known as Independent Chartered Military Commands. Since calling of the National Guard into federal service left them as the only organized defense force the state government encouraged them to expand and provided some supplies. Subsequently Constabulary Commands were established in four cities. The two groups served as a state defense force until mid 1918, when the General Assembly authorized the governor to organize a State Guard, consisting of not more than 36 nor fewer than 18 companies with 100 men each. With certain provisions to protect their rights and privileges as well as to adapt their ranks and organizations into a uniform state militia organization, the independent chartered military organizations were to be permitted to organize units as were the constabulary commands.

By 1 July 18 companies had been recognized and mustered into state service. In time all units were supplied with rifles by the War Department.

South Carolina

The state organized one regiment of Reserve Militia plus one additional battalion, a total of 1,187 men.

South Dakota

The State Council of Defense took prompt action to organize Home Guards in various counties and townships. In March 1918 legislation was finally passed to authorize the governor to create a Home Guard for the state. Money was appropriated for organization of the force but not for equipment or maintenance, and in time 7,000 men were members. The Home Guard was particularly active in protecting property against fire.

Tennessee

Tennessee had no legislation authorizing organization of an armed force for strictly state purposes and no funds to pay them. Therefore the governor sought authorization from the Secretary of War to organize a regiment of infantry. Such authority was granted on 2 November 1917. The regiment, 4th Infantry, was organized and fully recruited, with members "mustered into service for the State." A second regiment, the 5th Infantry,

was authorized in January. The 4th Regiment was inspected in December 1917 and the 5th in January 1918, and federal recognition was recommended. Approval was delayed for technicalities, but at the end of April both regiments were recognized as National Guard units.

Throughout this period the regiments had suffered many losses from enlistments and Selective Service inductions into the federal armed forces. So serious were these inroads (some units lost all their officers) that authority was requested and granted in August 1918 to reorganize as a single National Guard regiment, the 4th Infantry, plus a separate battalion and two separate companies.

Texas

Texas depended primarily on expanding its state force of Texas Rangers, whose functions were to protect the border with Mexico and to control crime. Eleven companies were operative in the war period. In August 1918 new National Guard units -- two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade -- were organized.

Utah

There was no state authorized home defense force. On 8 June 1918 the governor finally called for enough men from the unorganized militia to form a regiment of infantry of the National Guard of Utah, not to exceed 1,500 officers and men. The war ended before federal recognition was granted.

Vermont

On 26 May 1917 the governor ordered that a force be organized for service within the state and designated the First Regiment, Vermont Volunteer Militia. Age limits were set at 31 to 50 for enlisted men and 65 or under for officers. The force was to be equipped by the state but paid only when on active duty. By 27 June 1917 12 companies had been formed, in twelve cities, and a school for officers had been set up at Norwich University. By January 1919 a regiment had been organized. As was the case in many states, a sizable number of men went into the National Army through enlistment or draft, and the enlistment age for the Volunteers was dropped to 18 years.

Virginia

Nearly every community organized a home defense company to assist local authorities to maintain law and order. At the state level, the Virginia Volunteers were organized for state military service. By the end of 1917 two battalions (in Richmond and Roanoke) and eleven separate companies had been organized, with a total of 63 officers and 1,300 men. They supplied their own uniforms, but for the most part in 1917 had few rifles, since the state could not find any to purchase. Ultimately some rifles were procured from the War Department, but the companies were never fully equipped.

In 1918 an unsuccessful attempt was made to organize the 31 infantry companies into a National Guard regiment. The Richmond Howitzers' Machine Gun Company, however, was mustered into service as National Guard in September and officially recognized on 11 October.

The Volunteers lost 1,106 men in 1918, most of them to federal service, but in spite of that the membership in 1918 increased to 2,728.

Washington

On 11 July 1917, after considerable preparation, the governor authorized organization of the Washington State Guard, to consist of 16 infantry companies in the principal cities. First organized as a provisional regiment, the force was mustered into state service as the Third Infantry Regiment (four companies) on 15 September 1917.

Wisconsin

As early as 1905 legislation had been passed to provide for replacing the National Guard in the event it should be federalized. Thus in 1917 the Wisconsin State Guard was created. It consisted of four infantry regiments, with a reserve of 1 battalion, 38 separate companies, and 6 separate platoons. All State Guard organizations were required to have military drill and instruction three times a month, and an annual field camp of instruction. Members received no pay.

West Virginia

Legislation passed on 26 May 1917 provided for a special police force of 10 to 100 deputy sheriffs in each county. They were to be appointed by the sheriff, and serve under the governor's orders. Subsequently three companies of militia reserve were formed. They were dissolved six months after the war.

Wyoming

By the fall of 1917 some communities had formed protective organizations, armed with revolvers and pick handles. Although some steps had been taken toward forming a home guard none was in existence until 1918. How it was organized is not known. It was mustered out soon after the Armistice.

District of Columbia

No home defense force was formed.

CHAPTER II

US HOME DEFENSE IN WORLD WAR II

Introduction

In the United States, World War I posed relatively brief and limited problems of home defense, which were dealt with adequately by a variety of local solutions. Much greater and more systematic efforts were necessary to provide for internal security during World War II. In the longer conflict, forces for home defense were organized on a much more elaborate and uniform scale. The states authorized strength levels of more than 200,000 men through most of the war and usually maintained a mustered strength well over 150,000. The states also controlled a variety of volunteer local formations which were neither armed by the federal government nor paid for by the states.

In keeping with the managerial requirements of total war, the federal government coordinated domestic military planning, participated actively in setting standards for state military forces, and provided arms, equipment, training, technical guidance, and some financial assistance to the states. Overlapping federal and state roles occasionally blurred the traditional constitutional distinction between the responsibility for repelling invasion and the duty to maintain local law and order. Wartime developments resulted in several changes of mission for home defense forces, including a combat role. Although never called upon to fight, state forces in World War II proved a successful substitute for the National Guard in the more routine internal security duties.

The disbandment of the home defense forces after World War I was an uneven process. Many of the 27 states that had raised such forces had enlisted volunteers for the duration of the war plus one year, to allow time for the return of the National Guard to the states. With the signing of the Armistice and the rapid demobilization of US forces, many members understandably lost interest in an activity that now seemed unnecessary.

The consequent low attendance at drills contributed to the decision to disband home defense forces rapidly in several states. Yet some states -- including Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Vermont -- maintained Home Guards well into 1919 and even into 1920 because of the prolonged delay in reestablishing units of the National Guard.⁹ The wisdom of retaining these forces was demonstrated during the 102-day police strike in Boston in 1919, in which the entire Massachusetts State Guard was called into service.

New York, New Jersey, Colorado, and Illinois continued to maintain some of their wartime, federally-recognized National Guard reserve units, incorporating them into the permanent National Guard established by the National Defense Act of June 1920. National Guard units also received as recruits many men of military age who had served in home defense but had not been conscripted because of the short duration of the war. Some large industrial states hoped that units there would provide a nucleus for the rapid reconstitution of their National Guard organizations. Their hopes were frustrated by the necessity to comply with new federal regulations. The time required to change the organization and equipment of state units was in most cases at least equal to that of organizing new ones. Some constabulary-type home defense forces continued in different form after the war. The full-time active duty units of the Michigan State Troops, for example, were retained and later became the Michigan state police.

Establishment of the State Guards

With the spread of war in Europe and Asia early in 1940, the War Department recognized that the potential threats to the security of the United States required thorough planning in peacetime for the protection of civilians and vital defense installations. The creation of conventional civil defense organizations, already begun, would not be sufficient. The

⁹ The Vermont Volunteer Militia was maintained at full strength until June 1921. Nebraska not only continued its Home Guards, but briefly supplemented them with four companies of State Rifles.

Axis powers were considered likely to attempt espionage and sabotage, and to encourage civil unrest on a wider scale than in World War I. Parachute landings or other forms of raids were also considered possible. The War Department's plans for strengthening the Regular Army and inducting the National Guard into active federal service from September 1940 would be disrupted if combat troops had to be diverted to internal security and guard duties, as more than 100,000 had been in the months following the declaration of war in 1917. The problems of local security demanded the systematic organization of state military forces to take the place of the federalized National Guard to support law enforcement agencies.

New federal legislation was necessary to authorize the creation of state forces. The legal status of the home defense forces of World War I had been determined after the outbreak of war. But the summer of 1940 was peacetime, and section 61 of the National Defense Act of 1916 (quoted in the previous chapter), which had not been modified by the National Defense Act of 1920, forbade states to maintain troops other than the National Guard in time of peace. Accordingly a bill, introduced on 1 July and approved on 21 October 1940, amended section 61 by the following additions:

...provided further, That under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe for discipline in training, the organization by and maintenance within any State of such military forces other than National Guard as may be provided by the laws of such State is hereby authorized while any part of the National Guard of the State is concerned is in active federal service: Provided further, That such forces shall not be called, ordered, or in any manner drafted, as such, into the military services of the United States; however, no person shall, by reason of his membership in any such unit, be exempted from military service under any federal law: And provided further, That the Secretary of War in his discretion and under regulations determined by him, is authorized to issue, from time to time, for the use of such military units, to any State, upon requisition of the Governor thereof, such arms and equipment as may be in possession of and can be spared by the War Department.

The act was permissive, in keeping with the War Department's principle that internal security remained a local responsibility to be maintained by

troops under state control, primarily at state expense. It was left to the individual states to determine whether to raise forces at all, and to fix their size, composition, and terms of service, under provisions of current state military laws, or under new statutes if none existed. With regard to both legislation and organization, the federal role was to be one of suggestion and guidance rather than command and detailed control.

A good deal of interest in local defense already existed in some states. The Connecticut Adjutant General's office had prepared a plan in 1939 for the formation of a home defense force of World War veterans and had approached the American Legion, the VFW, and other ex-servicemen's organizations. In July 1940 New York set up a small headquarters staff to prepare the paperwork for reactivation of the New York Guard. Massachusetts had developed a state emergency plan several years before. The state's adjutant general arranged a one-week refresher course in the summer of 1940, for officer candidates who would later form the cadre of the Massachusetts State Guard. Three hundred former National Guard and World War I officers attended. In August 1940, four retired and reserve officers in California formed a civilian preparatory unit, "The Southern California Home Defense Force," with the implied approval of the state Adjutant General. This organization trained and drilled 1,200 civilian volunteers without military equipment. Several of its senior officers received commands in the California State Guard when it was formed in 1941.

Sixteen states possessed adequate military legislation before passage of the federal enabling act of 21 October 1940. In order to guide the others, in November the drafting committee of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense cooperated with the War Department in the preparation of a model State Guard Act (see Appendix B). The model act reflected some additional federal concerns: regulations for State Guards were to conform as much as possible to those for the National Guard; civil organizations could not join the State Guards as units; and state forces on active service could cooperate with

the military or police forces of another state. Cooperation with federal troops was not mentioned. The model act also established the term "State Guards" as the preferred title for state military forces.¹⁰

Interim instructions of 27 November 1940 set forth the views of the War Department on the shape of state forces and the extent of federal assistance to be offered to them. With regard to organization, it was recommended that most units be infantry or military police battalions, the types of units that had seemed to meet state requirements best in World War I. States could enlist as many troops as they felt necessary, but federal help was limited. The principal federal contribution was to be the free issue to each state of .30-cal. Enfield M1917 rifles, with bayonets and accessories, to an allowance not to exceed 50 percent of the enlisted strength of a state's National Guard enrollment as of 30 June 1940. The federal commitment would thus total approximately 111,000 rifles at most. Limited quantities of training manuals, ammunition, and quartermaster equipment were available for purchase. Neither uniforms nor weapons were available for sale or issue.

In the winter and spring of 1941 states that had been awaiting federal authorization and the publication of the model act proceeded with legislation, emergency appropriations, establishment of headquarters, and enlistment of volunteers. During the same period, the War Department designated the National Guard Bureau as the administrative agency for State Guard matters, and the nine corps area commanders as the channels of communication with the states. The National Guard Bureau prepared a definitive set of War Department regulations for State Guards during January and February 1941. These were issued as Army Regulations 850-250 on 21 April.

In addition to repeating the provisions of previous instructions on legal status and federal structure, AR 850-250 permitted open-market state purchases of arms, equipment, and distinctive uniforms as long as such did not compete with federal procurement; prescribed accountability procedures for federal property, particularly rifles, in state hands; and set forth general views on the training of state troops.

¹⁰ Initially 14 states used different titles for their forces. All except the Illinois Reserve Militia, the Kentucky Active Militia, and the Michigan State Troops changed to State Guards by 1943, at federal suggestion. Arizona, Montana, Nevada, and Oklahoma did not maintain forces during the war.

More important, AR 850-250 delineated War Department policy concerning the respective responsibilities of state and federal military authorities. State Guards were solely state forces, whose employment and composition were determined by the governors; federal involvement was still intended to be indirect and limited. The War Department would not issue specific instructions on the content of training; training objectives would be prescribed by state authorities, with the general assistance of the corps area commanders. In cases of confusion or dispute over the employment of state and federal forces in the same area, the issues would have to be resolved through cooperation rather than by the direct command authority of federal officers.

One or two situations may arise in this regard. In one instance, federal military forces and State Guard units may be operating in the same locality. Although each force may be acting within its proper authority, and although no question of conflict of responsibility may arise, the coordination of the activities of the respective forces is essential. In the other situation contemplated, conflict of views may exist as to the responsibility, whether federal or State, for a particular mission. In such a case, if the commanders of the federal forces and the State authorities are unable to effect an agreement, the matter should be referred to the appropriate corps area commander whose decision on the employment of federal forces under his command is final. The state authorities should conform to that decision in the light of the paramount federal concern with the national defense.¹¹

The organization of the State Guards across the country proceeded at an uneven pace. The induction of the National Guard was prolonged well into 1941, and it was not clear whether the Guard would be retained long in federal service. Several states, including Oregon and Pennsylvania, consequently chose to await developments. They completed plans, but merely augmented their police forces, feeling that active organization of State Guards was unnecessary until a real emergency occurred. Some states experienced delays in enacting legislation. Washington state briefly abandoned its plans at one point because there was no free equipment,

¹¹AR 850-250, Section 6b.

except for rifles, to be had from the federal government. Oklahoma apparently enrolled several hundred men early in 1941 and then disbanded them. However, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia rapidly organized state forces, even though hampered by shortages of uniforms, arms and equipment.

By June 1941, 37 states had a composite authorized strength of 123,527 men, with 88,936 actually mustered. Deliveries of rifles to the states totalled 94,422.¹² After a year's preparation and organization, state forces were adequate to perform the peacetime duties of the National Guard.

State Guard Missions, 1941-1945

Once war was declared the War Department took a serious interest in the missions that might be performed by State Guards as part of the general war effort. As the situation changed missions changed, usually causing changes in State Guards training and in the extent of federal supervision of state programs. While shifts in mission priorities sometimes place unintended strains upon state military organizations, some of the effects were beneficial. In particular, increases of equipment and other federal assistance enabled State Guards to upgrade standards, to improve performance, or to deal with difficult organizational problems.

The State Guards had four principal missions assigned to them from the period of their establishment to the end of the war. (1) The organizations initially performed only the peacetime duties of the National Guard. (2) In the year after Pearl Harbor, State Guards in coastal regions and other vital areas took on an emergency, full-time guard-duty mission. (3) From 1942 to early 1944, Guards in all states trained as combat troops to operate with federal forces in the event of invasion. (4) After March 1944 they reverted to an internal security role, but with increased responsibilities.

During the prewar formative period of the State Guards, the National Guard Bureau considered several possible roles for them. In addition to the usual emergency functions of the National Guard, they might be required to apprehend fifth columnists and saboteurs, or ultimately to

¹² *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1946*, p. 40. (Hereafter, *AR, NGB.*)

play some part in combating air or sea landings. In practice, however, the guards' training concentrated on their officially designated internal security mission. Calls to active duty in 1941 dealt only with the familiar problems of natural disasters, accidents, and civil disturbances.

One aspect of State Guards' employment in this category of duty raised concern about an undesirable feature of early State Guard development. In consequence of industrial conditions prevailing at the time of the federalization of the National Guard, State Guard training in several states emphasized the suppression of disorders in factories and mines. Many units appeared to be intended for use primarily as anti-strike forces. In the opinion of the National Guard Bureau, State Guards could lose considerable support among workers if they were exclusively identified with such a mission, since strikes were not necessarily the work of spies and agitators. Concentration upon training for industrial disputes would also inhibit the possibility of developing whatever combat potential the new organizations might possess.¹³

The problem posed by this tendency to concentrate on strike-breaking was eclipsed by the outbreak of war. Faced with the prospect of attacks upon the United States itself, the War Department assigned an unexpected new mission to the State Guards. Corps area commanders requested state governors to call out their troops for round-the-clock active duty, guarding vital installations and communications. By the end of December 1941, State Guards were on continuous duty in 16 states -- California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

December 1941 saw a high level of State Guard active duty after Pearl Harbor, but for a relatively brief period. Vermont called out all its units for ten days, and kept one of them on continuous service for a month longer. For a few days after Pearl Harbor, California had 15,000 guardsmen on active duty. When no enemy attack occurred during the first two weeks of the war, the states deactivated many of their

¹³ AR, NGB, 1946, pp. 154-55.

units. Nevertheless, a continuing requirement for static security troops in several states -- not all of them on the coasts -- kept thousands of state guardsmen on active duty over the next year, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4

STATE GUARDS ON ACTIVE DUTY 1942*

January	5,040
February	4,958
March	5,040
April	5,740
May	5,954
June	8,100
July	6,026
August	6,224
September	5,693
October	5,870
November	9,008
December	8,523

*Compiled from monthly strength reports in Box 118, Record Group 319, WNRC.

The bulk of these troops were in California, which had several thousand men on active duty at all times. Other states, including Iowa and New Jersey, maintained permanent duty battalions for guarding road junctions and other points important for communications.

The federal government adopted several other measures to bolster the security of vulnerable war production facilities and areas of military significance. In the weeks immediately following Pearl Harbor, up to 30,000 combat troops were temporarily diverted to the protection of vital installations. Continuation of such employment was undesirable as a detriment to morale and a waste of resources. In consideration both of this fact and of the state of equipment and training of many State Guard units, the War Department in January 1942 ordered the organization of 51 Zone of the Interior military police battalions (later increased to 89). These units were composed of officers over the age for combat duty, older enlisted men, and men selected from limited service categories, who were not

fully qualified for combat. Their composition thus superficially resembled that of the US Guards of World War I. Unlike the US Guards, however, the MP battalions did not disperse in small details, but remained stationed near important installations and critical areas to act as strategic reinforcements in case of civil disturbances or other emergencies.

Federal policy intended that these forces be used only as a last resort. The War Department required defense industries to organize their own civilian guards for local plant protection, with responsibility for supervision and inspection assigned to the Provost Marshal General. Beyond this the prewar federal policy on the protection of civilian facilities continued in force: the primary responsibility still lay with the State Guards, state police, constabulary, local police, or private civilian guards.¹⁴

The employment of large numbers of State Guards on extended active duty seemed unavoidable in several states, in view of the fear of invasion that prevailed after Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless problems arose immediately. State Guards were neither organized nor intended for continuous full-time service. State Guardsmen were civilians with jobs; they expected only brief periods of active duty in case of disasters, riots, or war-related emergencies. Their continued absence disrupted normal business as well as war production. States had not anticipated having to pay indefinitely for large numbers of full-time troops. Guardsmen did not know how long their families would have to exist on active-duty pay, generally well below civilian wages. More important, if large numbers of Guardsmen were tied to static duties, there might not be sufficient mobile state forces available to aid local authorities in dealing with emergencies.

On 6 January 1942 the War Department requested that all federal employees be discharged from the State Guards. This measure hit particularly hard at the forces of two of the principal active-duty states, Maryland and California. California, the state with the heaviest burden of active duty, tried unsuccessfully to retain federal employees in the California State Guard, and to secure deferments from selective service for State Guardsmen. In May 1942, three congressmen (all from California) introduced bills to form nationwide home defense forces. One proposed to federalize the

¹⁴ Letter, J.W. Martyn, administrative assistant to Chief, NGB, to Senator Robert R. Reynolds, 21 January 1942; Lt. Col. John S. Myers, speech before officers of the New York Guard, 28 February 1944.

existing State Guards; the second, to administer the guards through the states, but under federal control and financing; the third, to create a Home Defense Reserve as part of the regular army.¹⁵ The Secretary of War rejected these proposals because they entailed the unconstitutional assumption by the federal government of responsibility for local security. On the other hand, if such federalized forces were to be employed only in guarding sites important to the national war effort, it would be necessary to create still more state organizations to perform the conventional domestic security duties carried out by the State Guards.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau speculated that the static guard requirement might be met by adapting a feature of the British Home Guards to State Guard organization. Many of these British Home Guard units had more men than arms; the men performed part-time guard duty near their homes, in rotation, exchanging weapons from one shift to the next. This spread the burden more evenly, allowed the men to remain at their jobs, and made optimum use of both manpower and scarce equipment. An expanded State Guard reserve program in the United States might achieve the same results, it was suggested.¹⁶

The difficulties with extended active guard duty generated considerable thought about the proper relation between internal security requirements and the organizations charged with fulfilling them. Yet none of the measures proposed ever solved the problem. Conditions eased, and the requirement gradually disappeared. The fear of imminent invasion receded during 1942. Sabotage never proved a serious threat. Most State Guard units were sent home. By early 1943 only California had sizable forces on full-time duty. The federal government denied Governor Earl Warren's requests for additional arms, supplies, personal exemptions, and subsidies to cover active duty expenses. The governor accordingly declared that the California State Guard was no longer able to perform the mission. The state Adjutant General deactivated all units between February and June 1943. A new law reorganized the guard on the conventional basis of active duty only for training and emergencies.¹⁷

¹⁵AR, VGB, 1918, pp. 95-96. California AGO, *History of the California State Guard*, (Sacramento, 1946), p. 33.

¹⁶AR, MGB, 1918, p. 97.

¹⁷*History of the California State Guard*, pp. 30, 197-202.

In a sense, the active-duty guard role was an extended, top-priority digression from the main mission of all State Guards in the first half of the war. With the enthusiastic approval of State Guard officials, federal authorities assigned a *potential* combat mission to the guards, to act as auxiliaries to federal troops in case of invasion.

Upon the outbreak of war, corps area commanders (later, commanding generals of service commands) were to assume wide responsibilities for territorial defense. It was desirable to fit the State Guards into their defense plans, but the legal status of the guards complicated the task. Prewar regulations had not discussed joint federal-state operations, because none were contemplated under the original mission of the State Guards. The problem in 1942 was how to coordinate activities without direct federal command over the troops involved, and without the inconvenience of enacting new legislation. The first comprehensive wartime directive on the mission, training, and employment of State Guards defined the relations between state and federal military forces in such a way as to avoid the difficulty.¹⁸ The missions of the State Guards were listed as:

(a) Maintain the laws; suppress disorders; and protect the life and property of individuals within the State.

(b) Meet such domestic emergencies as may arise within the State, including civil disturbances and disasters resulting from both war or other cause [sic].

(c) Guard and protect vital industries, installations communications and facilities essential to the war effort when other means such as local police or protection by civil guards are deemed inadequate by authorized State or federal agencies.

(d) Prevent or suppress the activities of enemy agents such as fifth columnists and parachute troops either in the absence of, or in support or conjunction with, federal troops.

(e) Cooperate with federal military authorities in extreme emergencies, especially in information duties at or near frontiers and in the evacuation of civilians.

(f) Perform such other duties as were assigned to the National Guard when not in federal service.

The uncertainties involved in the new mission (e) were to be resolved by prior arrangement.

¹⁸ AG to commanding generals of all corps areas, 30 April 1942. These missions were reiterated in an updated version of AR 850-250, 9 August 1945.

State Guards shall not be called, ordered or in any manner drafted as such into the military services of the United States. Nevertheless, in the event of extreme emergency such as threatened invasion or disaster caused by hostile action, it can be assumed that practical control may and will be exercised over these forces through voluntary and wholehearted cooperation. In order to prepare now for just such eventualities and in order that State Guards may be included as an integral part of any plans relative thereto, Corps Area Commanders will contact the governor of each of the states in each of their respective Corps Areas requesting that State Guards be assigned a mission of cooperating with appropriate Federal military authorities in the event of extreme emergency. In the accomplishment of cooperative missions, it is not contemplated that State Guards will be either employed outside the boundaries of their respective states or commanded by federal military authorities but, rather, that they will undertake and carry out such missions as may have been previously planned by mutual agreement or which they may be requested to undertake at a critical moment.

This document provided the authority for the preparation of corps area emergency plans which included the use of federal troops to supplement the State Guards, or to assume temporary control of an area.¹⁹ For the rest of the war, then, the headquarters staffs of the service commands and of the state adjutants general officially allocated joint operational tasks to State Guard units by a process of negotiation.

The principal tactical responsibility of State Guard units was to make initial contact with an enemy force, then to harass and delay it until federal troops reached the area. Other tasks in the event of invasion included the provision of rear area security, military and civilian movement control, and engineer support. This combat role was given primary emphasis in State Guard training (even in states in the middle of the country mustering very small forces) until the end of 1943, although such a mission probably would have been difficult to accomplish with the prevailing levels of armament and equipment.

¹⁹ See, for example, Letter, Major Gen. Uhl, commanding VII Corps area, to Governor Griswold of Nebraska, 22 May 1942.

From early 1944 each state maintained an elaborate emergency plan, with detailed responsibilities allotted to civil organizations, State Guards, and federal troops (if available). Federal and state roles in the planning and execution of combined military operations were determined by an agreement between the relevant state adjutant general and commanding generals of service commands (who had replaced corps area commanders). The agreements were renewed annually, with the approval of the state governors.

The War Department developed the last major change in the missions of the State Guards in the first three months of 1944. Allied forces had assumed the offensive worldwide. The perceived threat of invasion was over, and the combat training of the State Guards was becoming increasingly irrelevant. It was clear that virtually all Army combat troops would soon go overseas. The only federal units available in the event of internal emergencies would be a few remaining military police battalions. New federal emergency plans allotted to the State Guards the primary responsibility for the maintenance of internal security. They were expected to perform the mission with an absolute minimum of assistance from federal forces. At the same time Army Service Forces finally committed large amounts of equipment to the State Guards to make up for critical shortages.

State training returned to its original emphasis on disaster relief and riot control. The State Guards had of course dealt with local emergencies as they occurred all through their existence. The only differences in 1944 and 1945 were increased coordination with federal authorities, and improved capability as a result of better equipment.

Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the types of duty other than guard duty performed by various State Guard elements in 1943, 1944, and 1945. By far the largest amount of duty was concerned with natural disasters, primarily floods and hurricanes, but also including a very heavy snow in February 1945, for which several thousand men were called out to shovel for two weeks.

Figure 5

STATE GUARD ACTIVE DUTY, 1943-1945*
Civil Disturbances

State	1943			1944			1945		
	Incidents	Days	Officers	Men	Incidents	Days	Officers	Men	Men
Alabama	1	7	25	346					
Michigan	3	21	356	5,409					
Missouri	1	27	31	406					
Florida					3	6	66	699	
Pennsylvania					1	1	141	1,818	
Mississippi					2	4	34	358	
Indiana									
Illinois									
Iowa									
Kansas									
Maryland									
Texas									
TOTALS	5	55	412	6,161	6	11	241	2,875	5,151

*Based on AR, 333, 1946, Appendices H, I, and J.

Figure 6
STATE GUARD ACTIVE DUTY, 1943-1945
Natural Disasters¹

State	1943			1944			1945		
	Incidents	Days	Men	Incidents	Days	Men	Incidents	Days	Men
Arkansas	2	22	84	-	-	-	6	43	-
Georgia	1	1	2	1	1	5	1	2	43
Illinois	3	40	415	4	29	515	8	48	41
Indiana	4	12	20	-	-	-	1	18	452
Iowa	1	30	32	11	38	-	1	-	342
Kansas	1	4	2	4	14	55	-	-	-
Michigan	1	1	15	-	-	16	2	6	658
Missouri	3	21	195	-	-	-	1	3	170
Nebraska	1	30	50	4	15	152	1	1	-
New Mexico	1	5	2	1	9	20	-	-	1,232
North Dakota	3	24	9	-	-	-	-	-	149
Ohio	5	15	31	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wyoming	1	3	22	-	-	-	10	69	-
Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,321
Massachusetts	-	-	-	1	3	2	-	-	-
Mississippi	-	-	-	2	11	990	-	-	-
Rhode Island	-	-	-	2	8	21	1	1	0
West Virginia	-	-	-	2	7	141	1	14	2
New York	-	-	-	1	8	19	-	-	-
Alabama	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	10	11
Louisiana	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15	724
Tennessee	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	22
TOTALS	27	207	879	33	143	1,936	44	358	1,116
			6,968			18,030			8,858

¹Based on AR, 1943, 1944, Appendices H, I, and J.

²Snowing snow.

Figure 7

STATE GUARD ACTIVE DUTY, 1943-1945¹
Miscellaneous²

State	1943			1944			1945					
	Incidents	Days	Officers	Men	Incidents	Days	Officers	Men	Incidents	Days	Officers	Men
Georgia	1	1	2	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iowa	6	8	12	161	2	6	5	69	2	6	6	52
New Mexico	1	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Washington	13	151	14	284	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arkansas	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	31	-	-	-	-
California	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	13	-	-	-	-
Connecticut	-	-	-	-	1	1	8	90	-	-	-	-
Maine	-	-	-	-	2	9	5	56	1	3	4	30
Ohio	-	-	-	-	2	7	45	549	-	-	-	-
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	27	-	-	-	-
Utah	-	-	-	-	1	1	6	36	-	-	-	-
Vermont	-	-	-	-	2	2	5	37	-	-	-	-
Maryland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	11	5	92
West Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	20
Missouri	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	14
North Dakota	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	5	20
South Carolina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	5	18
Virginia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	5	44
TOTAL	9	162	15	220	13	30	81	908	11	30	35	297

¹Based on AR, NGE, 1846, Appendices H, I, and J.²Airplane crashes 10; Search for fugitives or missing people 6; Honor guard 3; Convoy 1; Fire 4; Explosions 2; Train wrecks 6; Aircraft warning 1.³Aircraft warning watch.⁴Average

The Structure of Home Defense

Federal Administration and Coordination

The preparation of the nation for war during 1940 and 1941 entailed the creation of new federal agencies responsible for the organization of passive civilian defense and the mobilization of industrial production. The War Department employed existing administrative machinery, on the other hand, to incorporate the newly-established state military forces into the national defense structure. The Secretary of War on 10 December 1940 designated the National Guard Bureau as the administrative agency for State Guard matters. State military authorities and the National Guard Bureau were to correspond with each other through the commanding generals of corps areas.

The outbreak of war produced one significant addition to these arrangements. The reorganization of the War Department in March 1942 grouped the supply, procurement, internal security, and administrative functions of the Army within the United States under a new organization, Services of Supply. The commanding general, Services of Supply (referred to hereafter by the later designation, Army Service Forces), assumed responsibility for the formulation of War Department policies toward State Guards, and for the supervision of planning and coordination of State Guard activities. The National Guard Bureau and the headquarters of the corps areas (renamed service commands in July 1942) continued as the executive agencies for state military affairs within the ASF structure.²⁰

The National Guard Bureau performed a variety of coordinating and staff service duties as the principal link between state and federal military administrations. It drafted War Department regulations, instructions, tables of organization and allowances, training program suggestions, and other documents concerning State Guards. The Bureau also monitored the condition of state forces. State adjutant generals' offices submitted returns of arms, ammunition, equipment, and monthly unit strength reports. Service command headquarters reported the results of federal inspections of State Guard units.

²⁰ The reorganization of March 1942 initially placed the National Guard Bureau under the Adjutant General. The National Guard Association promptly protested this arrangement. In April 1942 the NGB was made a separate administrative service, and, later, a staff division of ASF. See John D. Millett, *The Organization and Administration of Army Service Forces*, p. 350.

From these sources and various other records which it maintained, the National Guard Bureau computed statistics and prepared studies of State Guard issues at the request of its Chief, or of the commanding general, ASF. Officers from the Bureau visited state field training camps in order to gain first-hand knowledge of unit equipment, state of training, activities, and problems.

The National Guard Bureau also assisted the state authorities in dealings with other federal agencies. State Guard requisitions for federal equipment and materials went through the service commands, but the Bureau acted as the states' representative when coordination in Washington was necessary. The National Guard Bureau arranged for clearances and priority ratings for State Guard purchases, and gasoline and tire rations, and handled administrative issues involving other offices, such as training doctrine, or medical care for State Guards while on active duty for training at federal installations.

With regard to planning and operations, the National Guard Bureau helped to define the role of state forces in the successive emergency plans evolved by the War Department. Once plans were formulated, it monitored the local coordination of state and federal missions, as negotiated by the service commands and State Guard officers. As an aid in combating domestic disturbances, the Bureau maintained a "map book", which contained a station list showing the number and type of State Guard units located in or near critical areas.

Not all War Department measures affecting state military forces passed through the National Guard Bureau. For example, state forces were influenced by the policies and activities of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, which was the ASF agency responsible for the coordination of many aspects of area defense plans, and for the protection of war industrial plants and federal installations. The request to the state governors on 7 and 8 December 1941 to place their forces on active duty came from the Office of the Provost Marshal General, not the National Guard Bureau.

Commanding generals of the service commands had two major home defense force responsibilities during the war. First, they remained the

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federal agency charged with assisting state military authorities in the training and development of the State Guards. Service command headquarters received state requisitions, issued arms, supplies, and equipment, and superintended the details of state property accountability. With the coming of war, the state training responsibilities of the service commands expanded far beyond the provision of guidance to state training officers and the transmission of suggested training programs from the National Guard Bureau. From April 1942 the War Department directed the service commands to furnish part-time instructors from Army forces stationed near state units, and such training aids, manuals, and film strips as could be spared from bases under the control of the service commands. Service command schools soon included State Guard officers and specialists in their courses.

The War Department maintained a positive control over the standards of State Guard units through the increasingly thorough system of service command inspections. In theory the state military authorities were masters in their own houses in regard to standards of efficiency for units and individual troops. In this the State Guards of World War II more closely resembled the Home Guards of World War I than the federally-recognized National Guard Reserve units of that war. State recognition created a unit, but federal inspection formed a key part of the process by which a unit could be disbanded.

Before Pearl Harbor, inspectors from corps area staffs primarily examined the condition and protection of federal property issued to State Guard units, as required by current regulations. Once war began, the National Guard Bureau instructed inspectors to report on the general condition of units as well, and to use inspections as opportunities to give tactful advice to commanders on the correction of shortcomings. Inspections by the appropriate service command was made an annual requirement in August 1943 and a federal form was provided. Inspections covered records of recruiting, hours of instruction, active duty during the year, etc.; state of training, ordnance, and equipment; adequacy of training facilities, alert plans, and coordination with local authorities. Units receiving unsatisfactory ratings were placed on three months' probation

and reinspected. If the unit failed a second time, the inspector recommended to the state authorities that it be disbanded. As shown in Figure 8, disbandment for inefficiency was relatively rare.

Figure 8

STATE GUARD UNIT INSPECTION RATINGS 1942-1945*

	1942	1943	1944	1945
Satisfactory	2,085	2,261	3,081	3,083
Unsatisfactory	54	83	123	218
Reinspected	44	27	60	86
Disbanded	5	7	10	-
Commended	345	271	119	-

* AR, NGB, 1946, p. 57. States disbanded units for other reasons as well, particularly for inability to maintain enlisted strength through local recruiting. Highly dependent on the character of the localities in which they were stationed, State Guard units were adversely affected by such factors as lack of interest among the community, high rates of selective service induction, and local employment conditions.

In addition to overseeing the development of the State Guards, commanding generals of service commands had a second responsibility toward the states. They dealt with state and local civilian authorities in the use of State Guards and local police forces. This entailed the integration and coordination of local emergency civil defense and military missions with federal military priorities, and with the overall service command defense plan. Service commands maintained staff liaison sections which arranged with state military authorities for the allotment of missions in joint federal-state operations in the event of invasion.

Federal direction of state functions in controlling civil disturbances increased in 1944, with emphasis placed on the State Guards as the main guarantee of local law and order after most combat troops went overseas. At the same time, the increasing improbability of invasion or air attack caused a decline in federal and state emphasis on purely civil defense programs and the provision of local security for industrial plants.

Conferences provided a mechanism through which the various federal echelons responsible for State Guard administration could discuss current problems and policies. Service command conferences, called periodically by Army Service Forces, included State Guard matters in their agendas. In December 1944 a conference entirely devoted to the roles, problems, and administration of State Guards was held in Chicago. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands attended, as did representatives of the National Guard Bureau and of the Military Personnel and Military Training Divisions of ASF. State adjutants general also met in conference several times during the war, and commanding generals of service commands convened meetings with state military authorities within their areas of jurisdiction.

State Military Organization

The states responded in different ways to meet the requirements of home defense in its broadest sense. There was a variety of ways of organizing state defense committees to take account of local conditions. Yet for the control of their new military forces, the states generally employed the machinery with which they administered the National Guard.

State adjutants general commanded the State Guards, under the authority of the governors as commanders-in-chief. Within state military departments, the adjutant general's office functioned as the headquarters staff of the State Guards. As the responsibilities of state headquarters increased during the war, the guards were able to draw upon experienced former Regular Army and National Guard officers in the senior ranks of the State Guards to perform staff duties.

In practice, the duties of State Guard headquarter staffs were somewhat different from the administration of National Guard formations, because of the composition and legal status of State Guards as purely state organizations. State Guard units were recognized by the states as they formed, under standards laid down by the states. All commissions, promotions, and other personnel functions were in state hands. It was not intended that equipment levels, physical qualifications, etc., should meet War Department standards, but the initial absence of the sort of control which the War Department exercised over the National Guard led to considerable diversity in State Guard administrative procedures.

Early federal regulations on property accounting, for example, were not sufficiently specific, and some states developed accounting systems which were inadequate, difficult to audit, or which did not conform to War Department practice. Applicable National Guard regulations were intended for more complicated units. The National Guard Bureau accordingly devised a simplified State Guard property accounting system, which was distributed in March 1943.

The structures of the State Guard organizations were quite diverse. Their size and composition depended upon the area and population of states, and upon a particular state's perception of the threats to public order. South Dakota's entire State Guard consisted of only four companies of infantry. Illinois on the other hand established a full infantry division and an air corps, with an elaborate staff organization.

Individual State Guard structures did not remain constant throughout the war. Some changed their organization three times in reaction to external circumstances or administrative difficulties. Although federal legislation and instructions in 1940 and 1941 set no limit on the size of state military forces, in practice most states organized only units for which arms were available. For reasons of economy, moreover, they usually activated State Guard companies in particular towns only as National Guard units vacated their armories to enter federal service.

Several states therefore initially had truncated command structures. The Virginia Protective Force organized companies and battalions as its only tactical and administrative units; the organization of regiments and area commands was not contemplated. The Adjutant General of Connecticut acted as brigade commander of the State Guard, but did not form regimental headquarters, in order to relieve the civilians manning the smaller units of the paperwork responsibilities of keeping regimental records.

With the doubling of federal rifle allowances at the end of December 1941, states enrolled more volunteers, and several reorganized their guards accordingly. The state of Washington, for example, raised an infantry regiment of ten companies in June 1941. In the weeks after Pearl Harbor, the Adjutant General increased the strength of the companies and activated an additional provisional infantry battalion. With the confirmation

of the new federal weapon allotment, the Washington State Guard adopted a more logical brigade organization of two regiments in February 1942.

In order to standardize their unit organizations, state authorities repeatedly requested an official State Guard table of organization. In July 1943 the War Department authorized the National Guard Bureau to distribute suggested, non-mandatory tables of organization, only to state adjutants general who requested them. Seven states and Hawaii reorganized on the basis of the suggested tables in 1944.

Most large states assigned regional responsibilities to their regimental, brigade, and (in some cases) area headquarters: the companies and battalions in a particular county or city would deal with any local disasters or disturbances, with reinforcements coming from adjacent units as necessary. Some local State Guard reserves (see below, p.58) might be called out to help. There were two important exceptions to this organizational pattern -- the Massachusetts and California State Guards.

From the beginning of the prewar home defense movement, Massachusetts was one of the most enthusiastic and combat-oriented states. The Massachusetts State Guard was established on 31 December 1940, and originally counted three infantry brigades, a cavalry troop, a motor squadron, and support battalions, stationed at various points throughout the state. Feeling extremely vulnerable to German raids, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety sent a mission to London to study British Home Guard methods and organization, and after Pearl Harbor raised 50 companies of part-time, unpaid State Guard reserves. These reserves were merged in August 1942 into a State Guard structure organized in mobile and local components. The state was divided into ten regions, each comprising city and town security units (platoons, companies, or battalions) under a colonel or region commander. These regional units were assigned local security missions within their home towns and could be moved out of their stations only by order of the Adjutant General. In addition a mobile force for service anywhere in the state was established, with a division headquarters, three motor squadrons, engineer and medical battalions, and other support units. Finally, a 50-man motorized flying column was established in September 1943. This was a full-time, paid unit, which performed

extended guard, administrative, and training demonstration duties. Massachusetts thus had an organization that demanded relatively little time from the members of the region units, but kept smaller better equipped and more highly trained reaction forces under central control.²¹

California experienced probably the greatest variations in structure of any State Guard, as a result of its commitment to extended active guard duty. During 1941 the state organized six infantry regiments and many support units. Authorized strength was 10,000 men, but on 1 December the state mustered 21,615. Virtually all units were ordered to active duty in 1942, but under a novel organization. In order to draw as many men as possible into active duty from the rush of volunteers after Pearl Harbor, the legislature enacted a new State Guard law in January 1942. This provided for 13 regiments of 2,160 men each. Only one-third of the strength of each *company* was to be active, with the remainder organized into reserve platoons. Volunteers elected active or reserve status upon enrollment. This system could not meet the demands of extended active duty, and was ended by the inactivation of most units during the first half of 1943. A third State Guard act passed in May 1943 laid down no maximum or minimum strengths, restricted active forces to a maximum of two regiments plus auxiliary troops, and limited the inactive forces to disaster duty within their own countries, except for occasional active duty for training. In effect the only members of the California State Guard on full-time duty after 1943 were those on the headquarters staff in Sacramento.²²

In keeping with federal recommendations, the limited types of equipment available, and the character of designated missions, the great majority of State Guard units were infantry companies and battalions, as shown for 1942 in Figure 9. States organized military police, engineer, service, transport and signal units, depending on availability of equipment. At least four states had horse cavalry squadrons. Medical and ambulance units formed part of every State Guard force. Women served as State Guard nurses and as auxiliary drivers, sometimes organizing their own

²¹Massachusetts, AGO, *History, Mass. Volunteer State Guard*, pp. 10-20.

²²*History of the California State Guard*, *passim*.

Figure 9

STATE GUARD TYPE ORGANIZATION BY STATE, July 1, 1942

STATE	State Guard Batt	Brigs	Regts	Bns	Co's (incl. Detach)	App. E.M. Per Co.	1st Lt. Per Co.	Service Co's	Medical Units	Arm Units	Inf. Co's	Coastal Units	Engineer Co's	Military Police	Water Transport Co's	Prov. Co's	Aviation Bn's or Squadrons	Signal Battalions or Squadrons	Amph. Battalions or Squadrons	State Guard Battalions or Squadrons	Aviation Units	Other Units & Organizations
1. Alabama	1			5	70	40																
2. Arizona																						
3. Arkansas																						
4. California			12	20	102	102																
5. Colorado																						
6. Connecticut																						
7. Delaware																						
8. Dist. of Columbia																						
9. Florida																						
10. Georgia																						
11. Idaho																						
12. Idaho																						
13. Illinois																						
14. Indiana																						
15. Iowa																						
16. Kansas																						
17. Kentucky																						
18. Louisiana																						
19. Maine																						
20. Maryland																						
21. Massachusetts																						
22. Michigan																						
23. Minnesota																						
24. Mississippi																						
25. Missouri																						
26. Montana																						
27. Nebraska																						
28. Nevada																						
29. New Hampshire																						
30. New Jersey																						
31. New Mexico																						
32. New York																						
33. North Carolina																						
34. North Dakota																						
35. Ohio																						
36. Oklahoma																						
37. Oregon																						
38. Pennsylvania																						
39. Rhode Island																						
40. South Carolina																						
41. South Dakota																						
42. Tennessee																						
43. Texas																						
44. Utah																						
45. Vermont																						
46. Virginia																						
47. Washington																						
48. West Virginia																						
49. Wisconsin																						
50. Wyoming																						
51. Wyoming																						

Excludes 1st Regt of
1st Div., 1st Corps

Compiled from Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1942

cars into motor transport corps. Several State Guard aviation units existed at various stages of the war, serving both as air patrols and as reconnaissance squadrons during field training exercises. Four states had small naval militias, which were mainly used for inshore boat work. The number, quality and variety of support units increased as more equipment became available.

State Guard Reserves

In many states, armed local volunteer units assisted the State Guards. Under various names, but generally referred to as State Guard Reserves by the War Department, they acted in emergencies under the control of the state military command structures, but were not part of the State Guards. State Guard Reserve units operated only in their own towns or rural localities. Members served without pay and provided their own uniforms, arms, and ammunition. Many of them belonged to gun clubs, and the firepower of some SGR units greatly exceeded that of State Guard units of similar strength.

State Guard Reserves were the result of two prewar developments. Many quasi-military and civil defense groups were formed in 1940 and 1941 by patriotic and veterans organizations, supported by local contributions. The American Legion on the Pacific coast organized guard and patrol groups whose membership may have reached 12,000 in Washington, 12,000 in Oregon, and 67,000 in California. In some instances they antedated the formation of the local State Guard. California, for example, regularized the position of several self-armed units as Licensed Military Companies in 1941 and kept them in existence until 1943, when they were merged with the State Guard. Moreover, the geographical coverage of State Guard units was incomplete in many states. The availability of small arms tended to limit the number and strength of organized SG units. Even where volunteers were plentiful, especially after Pearl Harbor, and sufficient state-purchased arms could supplement the meager federal allotments, the security requirements for federally-furnished weapons limited State Guard formations to towns with National Guard armories or suitable alternate facilities. Reserve companies were thus a means of making use of volunteer manpower and providing minimum security, notably in Maryland, Washington, and the New England states. ²³

²³ The Massachusetts Region Units had a limited local mission similar to that of State Guard Reserves, but were full-fledged State Guard formations. Vermont incorporated its reserve companies into the State Guard in October 1942; Maine did likewise in May 1944.

Several federal regulations provided authorization and general guidance for State Guard Reserves. Section 8 of the model State Guard act prohibited the introduction of "private armies" into the state military structures: "No civil organization, society, club, post, order, fraternity, association, brotherhood, body, union, league, or other combination of persons or civil group shall be enlisted in such forces as an organization or unit." After Pearl Harbor a number of armed civilian protective groups began training programs based on the guerilla warfare tactics of the British Home Guards. The federal government took notice of these bodies because they often had no standing under state laws. In April 1942 the National Guard Bureau pointed out that such groups of citizens would not be considered combatants by an enemy unless they conformed to the rules of international law regarding uniforms, organization, responsibility, and authority. The object of the War Department was to control volunteer enthusiasm without discouraging it. Initiative and responsibility were again left to individual states. The directive to the commanding generals of corps areas on the missions, training, and employment of State Guards declared:

Some states may choose to supplement their present State Guards by creating additional local forces for home defense. The War Department offers no objection, provided these units are legally and officially affiliated with the authorized State Guards. These local groups might be called "Local Defense Force-State Guard Reserve", or a similar appropriate title. ²⁴

By September 1943, 14 states and Hawaii maintained State Guard Reserves, with a mustered strength of 45,867, ranging from 20 men in New Hampshire to 10,711 in Maryland (five times the size of its State Guard). At the same time State Guard mustered strength nationwide was 168,839. The reserves were disbanded rapidly at the end of the war, but 10,601 men were still on the rolls in eight states as of 30 June 1946. ²⁵

State Guard Reserves were organized in independent companies or platoons, directly under the command of the state adjutant general. They were usually assigned to a local State Guard battalion commander for general supervision

²⁴ Letter, AG to CGs of corps areas, 30 April 1942.

²⁵ Letter, Chief, HGB, to State AGs, 30 October 1943; *AG, HGB, 1946*, pp. 58-60.

and training, and personnel files were maintained at state level. Officers were frequently elected, and in many states were eligible to attend Army Service Command schools on the same basis as State Guard officers. Drills were generally less frequent than in the State Guards, although reserve units did participate in State Guard maneuvers and field training exercises. Initially the mission of the reserves was to serve as a local early warning and intelligence source for regular troops, and as a delaying force. Training stressed guerrilla tactics, patrolling, demolitions, and roadblock techniques. After the March 1944 shift in the primary mission of the State Guards from repelling invasion to internal security duties, the State Guard Reserves changed to training for assisting local authorities in disaster relief.

State Guard Links with Civil Defense

The prewar State Guards developed quite separately from the federally-sponsored programs of unarmed civil defense, as well as from Army early-warning systems. The result was observed in a National Guard Bureau report of January 1942, which compared the British Home Guards with the State Guards:

Here in the United States the degree of control which military authorities have been able to exercise over the State Guards through the Bureau which has been specially charged with their administration has been very slight. Their relation to the air warning systems of the air defense commands, to the jurisdiction of corps area commanders and commanders of possible theaters of operations, to local police and fire air raid protection units, and to the Office of Civilian Defense is very tenuous, indefinite, and inconclusive. There is too little precision in defining jurisdiction and too much overlapping, too little control and too much dependence on mere cooperation. ²⁶

Coordination between State Guard units and local civil defense authorities improved greatly in the course of the war. As in the case of Army-State Guard relations, this was achieved through increased cooperation rather than the exercise of official authority of either organization over the other.

²⁶ AR, NGB, 1946, p. 158.

In most states, the State Guard and civil defense programs were linked only at the highest level, in the person of the state adjutant general. The adjutants general were usually ex officio members of the state defense committees designated by the OCD as the headquarters of state civil defense programs; often they chaired the committees. Their functions in this capacity were separate from their duties as senior officers of the State Guards and heads of state military departments.

Lines of responsibility for civil defense ran from the state defense committee to county and municipal civil authorities. None of these officials could give orders to State Guard units. At the local level, some State Guard officers and enlisted men simultaneously held assignments in OCD organizations in their communities early in the war. As it would obviously be impossible to carry out both duties in a real emergency, the War Department forbade such dual assignments in 1942.²⁷

Federal pressure for coordination of all federal, state, and local agencies in the preparation of emergency defense plans intensified throughout the war. Most State Guard companies and battalions practiced alerts and mobilization exercises with local civil defense organizations. Guard and civil defense personnel received similar training in some subjects. In 1943, for example, the Ohio State Guard staffed a mobile gas warfare demonstration school which instructed more than 25,000 civil defense workers in addition to its own units. Some states viewed their State Guard Reserves primarily as armed adjuncts to local civil defense programs. The Washington state aircraft warning services paid for the maintenance of a 30-man State Guard spotter unit on full active duty on the sparsely-populated Olympic peninsula for over a year.

The State Guards remained activated until 1947, but civil defense activities declined from 1944. During the time that the organization operated together, their relationship was one of mutual support with little formal connection.

²⁷ Letter, Chief, NGB, to State AGs, 23 April 1942.

State Guard Personnel

Terms of Service

State Guards were local, part-time military forces like the National Guard, but their standards of enlistment and other terms of service could not be the same as those for the units whose places they took. Moreover, the absence of federal or other standardization in personnel matters resulted predictably in great diversity of requirements from state to state.

Several states did follow a single example in regard to duration of enlistment in the early days of the State Guards. California, Maryland, Nebraska, South Carolina, Vermont, and others adopted the model State Guard Act's term of one year, renewable for a further year. Illinois required a two-year initial enlistment in 1940, and Massachusetts three. All were terminable earlier at the discretion of the governor, or upon the return of the National Guard from its period of federal active duty.

Enlistments under wartime State Guard reorganization laws were usually for longer periods, for example, three years in the case of Florida, and for the duration of the war in California.

The nature of the State Guards made it difficult to require enlistment for the duration; there were numerous grounds for voluntary separation. Volunteers necessarily enlisted in a particular local unit, not in the State Guard generally; moving to another town or state terminated enlistment. Officers and men could resign for business reasons. Unit commanders in some states were instructed to release defense plant workers, even when no prolonged active duty was contemplated. Finally, older guardsmen were permitted to resign if they were no longer physically qualified.

Some states, including Maine, Massachusetts and New York, maintained inactive State Guard lists as an alternative to the resignation or separation of men who could no longer serve because of business activities or change of residence to an area without units. Such inactive officers and men did not train, but could be called out in extreme emergencies.

There was no uniformity in age limits for enlistment. In October 1940 Maryland attempted to trim both sides of the selective service manpower pool by setting its enlisted age limits at 18-21 and 36-50 years old.

All states soon allowed selective service registrants to enlist in the State Guard although it was understood that many would be called up within a short time. The lower age limit was set initially at 18 years by most states; Massachusetts chose 20, and Colorado, 25. As conscription and enlistments in the federal armed forces took their toll, Connecticut, Nebraska, New York, and Vermont lowered their limits to 17. Idaho enlisted 16 year-olds. Upper age limits for State Guard service ranged from 45 (Illinois) to 65 (Tennessee). Officers were generally required to be over 21 and under 60 years old.

State Guard personnel were paid for periods of active duty, whether for guard, disaster relief, or aid to civil power, and received subsistence during such service. Various rates applied in different state forces before the war, but after Pearl Harbor most states paid the federal army's daily rate for a man's grade. Uniform allowances, and pay for armory drills and field training camps varied widely, as shown in Figure 10.

Officers

During the formation of the State Guards, state military authorities relied on former Regular Army and National Guard officers to provide experienced volunteer leadership for the new units. New Jersey and Connecticut permitted units to elect their first officers, requiring only that their choices had served in World War I and could demonstrate leadership ability. Early State Guard regulations usually prescribed prior military service, or at least university or high school officer training, as a condition for commissioning. Later many State Guard officers were commissioned from the ranks after a minimum of a year's service. The state adjutant general's office controlled all officer assignments, promotions, and commissions. Promotion boards generally based their standards on those of the National Guard, with allowance made for the different character of the forces.

Manpower

Figure 11 shows total authorized and actual strengths in June and December of the war years. Figure 12 shows mustered strengths by state in June of 1944. Volunteers for state forces were plentiful at the beginning of the war, but the *maintenance* of sufficient manpower plagued the State Guards throughout their history. States were seldom able to recruit up to

Figure 10

UNIFORM ALLOWANCE, PAY FOR ARMORY, DRILL, AND FIELD TRAINING CAMPS AUTHORIZED BY STATES FOR THEIR STATE GUARDS

State	Uniform allowance	Pay for armory	Pay for training camps			
Alabama	None	One-half of 1 day's base pay for each drill, subject to tables authorized by Regular Army.	Same as Army pay tables.			
Alaska	None	None	None.			
Arizona	\$75 for officers upon being commissioned.	do.	Appropriation for fiscal year 1916 and 1917 includes pay for Regular Army pay scale for attendance at summer encampment.			
California	None	do.	Regular Army pay.			
Colorado	\$60 for officers upon being commissioned.	Colonel will receive no pay; Lt. col. and first lt. \$1.10; 1st lt. and 2nd lt. \$1.00; 3rd lt. or 4th lt. \$0.90; 5th lt. or 6th lt. \$0.70; 7th lt. \$0.60; 8th lt. \$0.50.	Col. \$15.11; lt. col. \$13.72; maj. \$11.93; capt. \$9.97; 1st lt. \$8.05; 2nd lt. \$7.10; 3rd lt. and 4th lt. \$5.31; 5th lt. and 6th lt. \$4.75; 7th lt. or 8th lt. \$4.25; 9th lt. or 10th lt. \$3.54; pfc. \$3.75; pvt. \$3.50.			
Connecticut	\$100 initially; \$50 yearly.	None	First grade, \$4.50; second grade, \$3.50; third grade, \$3.25; 4th grade, \$3.00; 5th grade, \$2.50; 6th grade, \$2.25; seventh grade, \$2.15.			
Delaware	do.	do.	Army pay tables.			
Florida	\$75 initially; \$25 yearly.	do.	Do.			
Georgia	None	do.	None authorized but Georgia State Guard pays all expenses including travel for those attending.			
Hawaii	do.	do.	None.			
Idaho	\$50 per yr per officer.	On active duty receiving active duty pay—Army pay tables.	Army pay tables.			
Illinois	None	do.	None.			
Indiana	do.	Col. \$4.50; lt. col. \$4; maj. \$3; capt. \$2.75; 1st lt. \$2.50; 2nd lt. \$2.25; 3rd lt. and 4th lt. \$2; 5th lt. \$1.75; 6th lt. \$1.65; 7th lt. \$1.50; 8th lt. \$1.25; pfc. \$1.10; pvt. \$1.	Same as Armory Drill pay.			
Iowa	\$100 initially; \$25 yearly.	do.	Army pay tables.			
Kansas	\$25 initially.	Capt. \$2.50; 1st lt. \$1.50; 2nd lt. \$1.25; 3rd lt. and 4th lt. \$1; 5th lt. and 6th lt. \$0.90; 7th lt. and 8th lt. \$0.80; 9th lt. and 10th lt. \$0.70; pvt. \$0.60.	do.			
Kentucky	None	do.	None.			
Louisiana	do.	do.	Off., WO's, magts., rec. agts., and first agts.—Army pay tables. 2nd agt. \$2.50; 3rd agt. \$2.25; 4th agt. \$2; pfc. \$1.65; pvt. \$1.50.			
Maine	\$100 initially.	do.	Army pay tables.			
Maryland	\$10 per officer.	do.	Do.			
Massachusetts	\$35 per year.	do.	\$1 per day for all officers above grade of captain; \$2.50 per day for all officers officers up to and including captain; \$1.25 per day for all enlisted men.			
Michigan	\$100 initially.	do.	Army pay tables.			
Minnesota	\$100 basic allowance; \$25 yearly.	do.	Pay Readjustment Act of 1922.			
Mississippi	None	do.	Army pay tables.			
Missouri	\$10 per month for 12 consecutive months.	do.	Army pay in grade without allowances.			
Nebraska	None	do.	Army pay tables.			
New Hampshire	\$100 initially; \$25 yearly.	For enlisted men only, \$0.10 per drill.	Army pay tables.			
New Jersey	(1)	None	Army pay tables.			
New Mexico	None	do.	None.			
New York	\$50 per year.	do.	Army pay tables.			
North Carolina	(1)	do.	Do.			
North Dakota	\$50	do.	None.			
Oregon	\$75 yearly.	do.	Do.			
Ohio	None	Officers and enlisted men—one-third of base pay to each drill not to exceed \$5 but no officer to receive more than \$500 per annum drill pay.	Army pay tables.			
Pennsylvania	\$100 initially; \$30 yearly.	None	Do.			
Puerto Rico	None	Col. \$4; lt. col. \$3; maj. \$6; capt. \$5; 1st lt. \$4; 2nd lt. \$3; 3rd lt. \$2.50; 4th lt. \$1.80; 5th lt. \$1.40; pfc. \$1.15; pvt. \$1.	Same as armory drill pay.			
South Carolina	\$100 per year.	None	Army pay tables.			
South Dakota	None	do.	None.			
Rhode Island	\$50 initially; \$50 yearly.	do.	Officers—Army pay tables; enlisted men: Grade 1, \$4.20; grade 2, \$3.25; grade 3, \$2.50; grade 4, \$2.25; grade 5, \$1.85; grade 6, \$1.75; grade 7, \$1.50.			
Tennessee	None	do.	NG Fld. Trng. Pay Tables—1940—prior to Readjustment Pay Act.			
Texas	do.	do.	None.			
Utah	\$60 initially; \$38.75 overtime; \$15 maintenance.	Col. \$2.50; 1st lt. \$2.25; 2nd lt. \$2; 3rd lt. \$1.75; 4th lt. \$1.50; 5th lt. \$1.25; 6th lt. \$1; 7th lt. \$0.80; 8th lt. \$0.60; 9th lt. \$0.50; 10th lt. \$0.40; 11th lt. \$0.30; 12th lt. \$0.20; 13th lt. \$0.10; 14th lt. \$0.05; 15th lt. \$0.02; 16th lt. \$0.01; 17th lt. \$0.005; 18th lt. \$0.002; 19th lt. \$0.001; 20th lt. \$0.0005; 21st lt. \$0.0002; 22nd lt. \$0.0001; 23rd lt. \$0.00005; 24th lt. \$0.00002; 25th lt. \$0.00001; 26th lt. \$0.000005; 27th lt. \$0.000002; 28th lt. \$0.000001; 29th lt. \$0.0000005; 30th lt. \$0.0000002; 31st lt. \$0.0000001; 32nd lt. \$0.00000005; 33rd lt. \$0.00000002; 34th lt. \$0.00000001; 35th lt. \$0.000000005; 36th lt. \$0.000000002; 37th lt. \$0.000000001; 38th lt. \$0.0000000005; 39th lt. \$0.0000000002; 40th lt. \$0.0000000001; 41st lt. \$0.00000000005; 42nd lt. \$0.00000000002; 43rd lt. \$0.00000000001; 44th lt. \$0.000000000005; 45th lt. \$0.000000000002; 46th lt. \$0.000000000001; 47th lt. \$0.0000000000005; 48th lt. \$0.0000000000002; 49th lt. \$0.0000000000001; 50th lt. \$0.00000000000005; 51st lt. \$0.00000000000002; 52nd lt. \$0.00000000000001; 53rd lt. \$0.000000000000005; 54th lt. \$0.000000000000002; 55th lt. \$0.000000000000001; 56th lt. \$0.0000000000000005; 57th lt. \$0.0000000000000002; 58th lt. \$0.0000000000000001; 59th lt. \$0.00000000000000005; 60th lt. \$0.00000000000000002; 61st lt. \$0.00000000000000001; 62nd lt. \$0.000000000000000005; 63rd lt. \$0.000000000000000002; 64th lt. \$0.000000000000000001; 65th lt. \$0.0000000000000000005; 66th lt. \$0.0000000000000000002; 67th lt. \$0.0000000000000000001; 68th lt. \$0.00000000000000000005; 69th lt. \$0.00000000000000000002; 70th lt. \$0.00000000000000000001; 71st lt. \$0.000000000000000000005; 72nd lt. \$0.000000000000000000002; 73rd lt. \$0.000000000000000000001; 74th lt. \$0.0000000000000000000005; 75th lt. \$0.0000000000000000000002; 76th lt. \$0.0000000000000000000001; 77th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000005; 78th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000002; 79th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000001; 80th lt. \$0.000000000000000000000005; 81st lt. \$0.000000000000000000000002; 82nd lt. \$0.000000000000000000000001; 83rd lt. \$0.0000000000000000000000005; 84th lt. \$0.0000000000000000000000002; 85th lt. \$0.0000000000000000000000001; 86th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000000005; 87th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000000002; 88th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000000001; 89th lt. \$0.000000000000000000000000005; 90th lt. \$0.000000000000000000000000002; 91st lt. \$0.000000000000000000000000001; 92nd lt. \$0.0000000000000000000000000005; 93rd lt. \$0.0000000000000000000000000002; 94th lt. \$0.0000000000000000000000000001; 95th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000000000005; 96th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000000000002; 97th lt. \$0.00000000000000000000000000001; 98th lt. \$0.000000000000000000000000000005; 99th lt. \$0.000000000000000000000000000002; 100th lt. \$0.000000000000000000000000000001.	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Figure 11

STATE GUARDS AUTHORIZED, MUSTERED, AND ON ACTIVE DUTY¹

		Number authorized ² by the States	Mustered		On active duty	
			Number	Percent of authorized	Percent of authorized	Percent of mustered
1941	December	192,119	144,293	75.1	2.6	3.5
1942	June	224,030	155,691	69.5	2.8	4.0
	December	232,920	168,934	72.5	6.0	8.2
1943	June	218,692	170,403	77.9	0.7	0.9
	December	208,939	167,614	80.2	0.5	0.7
1944	June	207,150	164,519	79.4	0.6	0.8
	December	206,794	159,335	77.1	0.4	0.5
1945	June	206,277	151,303	73.4	0.5	0.7
	December	205,685	145,617	70.8	1.0	1.4
1946	June	197,029	115,541	58.6	0.2	0.3

¹ LRG, RGS, 1946, p. 39.

² California reported its authorized strength as "unlimited." This necessitated reporting its lower mustered strength as authorized strength beginning with June 1943.

Figure 12

STATE GUARD MUSTERED STRENGTHS, 30 JUNE 1944*

<u>State</u>	<u>Mustered strength 30 Jun 1944</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Mustered strength 30 Jun 1944</u>
Alabama	2,428	Nebraska	662
Alaska	5,577	New Hampshire	936
Arkansas	1,215	New Jersey	1,930
California	10,997	New Mexico	676
Colorado	641	New York	17,148
Connecticut	3,497	North Carolina	2,177
Delaware	501	North Dakota	522
Florida	2,042	Ohio	4,174
Georgia	6,340	Oregon	1,596
Hawaii	159	Pennsylvania	4,328
Idaho	1,378	Puerto Rico	2,630
Illinois	5,859	Rhode Island	863
Indiana	2,110	South Carolina	6,152
Iowa	1,978	South Dakota	195
Kansas	1,296	Tennessee	5,995
Kentucky	1,674	Texas	16,262
Louisiana	1,807	Utah	506
Maine	1,757	Vermont	1,444
Maryland	2,682	Virginia	3,425
Massachusetts	14,065	Washington	3,724
Michigan	5,832	West Virginia	1,236
Minnesota	4,502	Wisconsin	2,548
Mississippi	1,840	Wyoming	411
Missouri	4,801		

* *Atk, 1946, 1:116* pp. 304-305

their authorized strengths, and shortage of troops eventually replaced shortage of equipment as the chief limiting factor of State Guard efficiency.

Turnover of personnel in State Guard units was extremely rapid. The New York Guard reported from 1942 to 1945 an average annual turnover of more than 80 percent of authorized strength; some units experienced a rate of 100 percent. Such figures were typical of many states. The principal cause of loss was the induction of State Guard officers and men into federal forces through selective service or voluntary enlistment. Figure 13 shows total numbers so lost by the various states. Many prospective draftees eagerly joined State Guard units in order to gain preliminary military experience which might earn them early promotion in the army. As in World War I, state officials looked on this pre-induction training role as a valuable, albeit unavoidable, additional service performed by the State Guards.

Late in the war overall strength figures declined, because enlistments failed to keep pace with losses, for several reasons. With the issue of more federal arms and equipment to State Guards in 1944, some states increased the authorized size of their forces, but the pool of eligible manpower continued to shrink. By this time, moreover, both the National Guard Bureau and the states recognized that the principal morale problem among State Guards was apathy. Troops were bored with repetitive training for internal security duties, and enrollments suffered accordingly. In 1945 some states undertook recruiting drives in an attempt to keep up State Guard numbers, with limited success.

Consolidated manpower statistics for most states are not readily available, but Connecticut and New York have provided some representative figures shown in Figures 14-17.

Figure 13

INDUCTEES FROM STATE GUARD ORGANIZATION TO 30 JUNE 1946¹

<u>State</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Alabama	1	15
Arkansas	17	1,127
California	89	2,208
Colorado	2	215
Connecticut	76	5,843
Delaware	8	408
Florida	57	2,021
Georgia	125	5,538
Idaho ²	26	1,212
Illinois	83	4,726
Indiana	94	2,414
Iowa	50	2,698
Kansas ²	-3	-3
Kentucky	100	2,247
Louisiana ²	-3	-3
Maine	250	1,408
Maryland	67	607
Massachusetts	260	8,616
Michigan	99	7,699
Minnesota	78	6,493
Mississippi	46	1,243
Missouri	225	6,583
Nebraska ²	-3	-3
New Hampshire	45	1,333
New Jersey	49	1,983
New Mexico ²	24	408
New York	746	21,853
North Carolina	500	2,832
North Dakota	3	193
Ohio	76	3,762
Oregon ²	29	944
Pennsylvania	780	4,172
Puerto Rico	16	688
Rhode Island	16	1,311
South Carolina	170	6,199
South Dakota	2	114
Tennessee	238	10,283
Texas ²	-3	-3
Utah	37	403
Vermont	20	1,861
Virginia	114	4,081
Washington ²	39	2,138
West Virginia	33	1,021
Wisconsin	31	984
Wyoming	32	458
TOTAL	4,753	130,405

¹From *U.S. Army, 1946*, Appendix G.²Last report of 1945 used.³Not reported.

Figure 14

CONNECTICUT STATE GUARD PERSONNEL, 1940-1945*

	Average Monthly Strength			
	Active Guard Officers	Enlisted	Volunteer Reserve Officers	Enlisted
1942	273	2,712	28	727
1943	309	2,985	64	1,422
1944	362	2,984	98	1,230
1945	376	3,103	-	-

* *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1941-1944*, pp.6-9
Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1945, pp.8-9.

Figure 15

CONNECTICUT STATE GUARD PERSONNEL, 1940-1945¹

Active Strength, 31 December 1944

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Age Groups:		
Under 18	-	1,274
18-21	-	269
21-30	13	608
30-45	155	812
45-60	193	206
Over 60	8	-
TOTAL	369	3,169
Length of Service:		
0 - 1 Year	16	1,949
1 - 2	28	669
2 - 3	43	259
3 - 4	213	254
Over 4	69	38
TOTAL	369	3,169

¹ *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1943-44*, pp.6-9.
Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1945, pp.8-9.

² Prior Military Service 201
From Enlisted Status 223

Figure 16
LOSSES, AUGUST 1940 - DECEMBER 1944*

Losses, August 1940 - December 1944

<u>Age Groups</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Under 18	-	2,111
18-21	-	1,979
21-30	25	2,463
30-45	76	2,058
45-60	40	525
Over 60	8	-
<u>Length of Service</u>		
0-1 Year	40	6,714
1-2	58	1,973
2-3	30	381
3-4	18	66
Over 4	3	2
<u>Separations</u>		
Armed Forces	16	3,433
Defense Reasons	-	788
Business Reasons	2	969
Non-Residence	-	356
Disability	-	112
Convenience of State	-	3,459
Died	6	19
Resigned	117	-
Retired	8	-
	149	9,136

*Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1942-44, pp. 6-9.

Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1945, pp. 8-9.

Figure 17

ENLISTED TURNOVER: GAINS AND LOSSES, 1945*

Enlisted Turnover: Gains and Losses, 1945

<u>Age Groups</u>	<u>Gains</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Under 18	1,578	1,108
18-21	333	412
21-30	245	377
30-45	255	355
Over 45	35	65
	2,446	2,317

*Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1945-46, pp. 6-9.

Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Connecticut, 1946, pp. 8-9.

Figure 13

NEW YORK LOSSES, ENLISTED MEN, 1942-1946

	<u>Dec 1941- Nov 1942</u>	<u>Dec 1942- Nov 1943</u>	<u>Dec 1943- Nov 1944</u>	<u>Dec 1944- Nov 1945</u>	<u>Dec 1945- Nov 1946</u>
Entered Armed Forces	4,503	6,305	4,044	3,740	2,769
Commissioned in N.Y. Guard	626	406	415	334	333
Change of residence	917	655	526	666	619
Failed to attend drills	2,269	2,560	2,310	1,901	1,506
Term of service expired	-	-	2,604	3,485	4,724
Disability not in line of duty	230	207	154	163	99
Ineptness	-	7	-	-	-
Fraudulent enlistment	21	5	13	6	12
Misconduct	1	1	-	-	-
Convenience of state (all other causes)	4,143	3,000	2,527	3,063	3,865
	12,710	13,146	12,593	13,358	13,927
Average enlisted strength for year	14,912	15,288	15,243	17,476	15,447

* From Annual Report of the Adjutant General, New York, for the years 1942 to 1946.

Arms and Equipment

Shortages of weapons and equipment hampered the development of State Guards until the later years of the war. The War Department recognized that the availability of arms determined the growth rate of the State Guards, but the needs of the Army itself were so acute that it was only slowly able to alleviate the difficulty.

As mentioned above, in November 1940 the War Department initially allotted to the states sufficient rifles to arm State Guards to a number equal to half the enrolled strength of each state's National Guard. Only ten rounds of ammunition were furnished for each rifle actually delivered. States wished to enroll only the number of men for which they had arms; most of them in effect considered the limitation to be a statement of the War Department's policy on the authorized strength of the State Guards.

Within a month after the declaration of war, the allotments were doubled, but the Army's own equipment crisis soon left the State Guards in a worse position than before. A critical shortage of arms forced the War Department on 2 April 1942 to recall all rifles issued to the State Guards. This measure caused a profound shock to the morale of state units. Some states attempted to purchase arms on the open market, as they were authorized to do, but the War Department stated that it would provide neither maintenance nor ammunition for non-standard rifles. Local citizens in some areas loaned their own weapons to State Guard units, or purchased shotguns and submachine guns for them. State protests induced the federal government to modify the recall policy slightly (New York, for example, retained 100 rifles per regiment), and to issue shotguns and submachine guns to State Guards.

The War Department was similarly unable to give much assistance in procuring many other items of equipment. A National Guard Bureau officer on a visit to State Guards in the First and Second Service Commands in 1942 noted the effect.

There was an apparent feeling, not directly expressed, that the federal government, while expecting 100% cooperation from the states in the use of their military forces, did not give the same cooperation in helping the states to secure the necessary clothing and equipment. 28

28 Col. Walter F. Adams, NGB, Memo for Chief, NGB, 3 July 1942.

Procurement of State Guard clothing presented particular difficulties. The federal government had not committed itself to supply any Army uniforms at all to the states. Beginning in 1942 states were able to purchase federal stocks of surplus Civilian Conservation Corps cloth, in order to supplement earlier open-market purchases of material for State Guard uniforms. State Guard commanders continually stressed that shortages of adequate uniforms and items of individual equipment had a great effect upon the morale and efficiency of their units. Guardsmen who had to drill in civilian clothes did not feel that they belonged to real military organizations. Initial state purchases or local donations often supplied uniforms sufficient only for indoor drill. Surplus CCC clothing looked unmilitary, did not fit many older guardsmen, or was suitable only for winter field service.

A further amendment to the National Defense Act of 1 October 1942 authorized issue to State Guards of arms, ammunition, clothing, and equipment in whatever quantities were considered necessary by the Secretary of War. This put federal assistance on a new theoretical basis. The measure had no immediate effect, however, because the needs of the combat forces took priority.

Up to 1943 the War Department was reluctant to publish tables of basic allowances or equipment for State Guard units, because they might imply to the states that the federal government would furnish the items listed if requisitions were made.

A study requested in July 1943 by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, recommended that State Guards receive adequate supplies of uniforms, rifles, and vehicles as quickly as possible without interfering with the requirements of the Army. Army Service Forces issued 15,000 rifles to State Guards in 1943. Most state units replaced their shotguns with reissued rifles from the Army during 1944. States also received considerable numbers of Browning M 1917 machine guns, and increased allowances of ammunition. Increases in ammunition allotments not only improved marksmanship training, but also permitted the accumulation of armory supplies for emergencies, separate from training ammunition.

By 1943 the War Department was able to begin issuing items of army OD clothing to State Guards. Most units were soon completely equipped for field service in any season.

The year 1944 was the watershed for federal assistance to State Guards for most types of equipment. The designation of the State Guards as the principal internal security force required the completion of their equipment; vast increases in war production made it possible. In mid-1944 the War Department began to distribute communications equipment, scout cars,²⁹ motorcycles, 1½-ton trucks, and ambulances to State Guards. Allotments of helmets, chemical ammunition, and gas masks were increased. Maintenance and operating costs for vehicles were to be borne by state military budgets.

Training

No State Guards ever mobilized to fight an organized enemy. Many units were never called during their existence to perform guard, disaster relief, or riot duty. The common activity of all guardsmen was training.

Federal participation in the training of State Guards -- as with their equipment, employment, and finance -- was deliberately limited at first. According to the prewar AR 850-250, detailed instructions for training were the responsibility of the military authorities of each state, taking local circumstances and needs into consideration. Corps area commanders were to offer general supervision; training was a function of command, and the State Guard units were commanded by state officers. The War Department laid down simple general standards for state troops:

- (1) Basic disciplinary training of the soldier
- (2) Physical training, personal hygiene, and first aid.
- (3) Their own interior economy and administration.
- (4) Their own shelter, supply, and movement.
- (5) Their own security.
- (6) Signal communication.
- (7) Protection against chemical agents.
- (8) The use of nontoxic gas and smoke.
- (9) The proper care and use of all weapons with which the unit is equipped.
- (10) Dismounted drill, to include the company.
- (11) Extended order drill.
- (12) Methods and formations for suppressing domestic disturbances. 30

²⁹ In 1943 the CG, ASF, refused the requests of Iowa, New Hampshire, New York, and Texas for obsolete light tanks.

³⁰ AR 850-250, 21 April 1941.

Standardization of State Guard training did not have as high a priority in 1941 as did the basic tasks of organization and procurement of equipment. With the expansion of the Army, moreover, the states could not get sufficient supplies of field manuals from the National Guard Bureau. The coming of the war accelerated federal interest in the training of the State Guards. The April 1942 directive on the missions, training, and employment of State Guards was accompanied by a suggested training program for rifle (shotgun) companies; programs for service companies and medical detachments followed shortly. Training was to be based on situations likely to be encountered by state troops.

The directive authorized an expansion in the state training functions of the service commands. Service command headquarters soon became the principal federal agencies for assistance to, and supervision of training. They furnished the states with training aids, literature, and films. Service command officers acted as instructors at State Guard schools and field exercises. Army units under service command control -- particularly the military police battalions -- provided demonstrators for tactical instruction in riot control and other subjects. As the unit training of the State Guards improved, service commands arranged joint maneuvers with Army troops. Most important, service command tactical schools began operation in 1942, instructing thousands of Army and State Guard officers and NCO's in tactics, weapons and demolitions, and field fortifications.

The tactical schools were a means by which the commanding generals of service commands could influence the training doctrines of state military forces. One of the earliest and most vigorous schools was established in June 1942 at Concord, Massachusetts by Major-General Sherman Miles, Commanding General of the First Service Command. Miles enthusiastically endorsed British Home Guard guerrilla tactics and used the week-long tactical courses to promote the combat mission of the State Guards. Officers (including states adjutants general) from states as far away as Texas and Missouri attended and spread the techniques of resisting invasion upon their return.

State Guards relied upon the intensive instruction of officers and NCO's to provide the means of training the rank and file. There were never

sufficient Army instructors to conduct unit training; the task of enlisted instruction was principally the responsibility of State Guard company and battalion officers.

Many of the larger states established State Guard schools beginning in 1943, giving specialized instruction to officers and NCO's on command and staff duties, transportation and driving, weapons, forest fire fighting, cooking, and communications.

A few dozen State Guard officers were permitted to attend the Army Provost Marshal General, Chemical Warfare, Adjutant General, and Engineer Schools.

Training literature in subjects relevant to State Guards was in short supply during the first year of the war. Several states produced field manuals which were adopted by the forces of other states, the most popular being the State Defense Force Manual published in Harrisburg in 1941 for the Pennsylvania State Guard. Several states compiled legal manuals for the use of State Guards. The National Guard Bureau prepared a manual for State Guards, but the Director of Training, ASF, and Chief of Administrative Services, ASF, did not allow it to be published, on the grounds that it duplicated the material in War Department technical and field manuals. In March 1943 the War Department began to issue training literature in quantity to State Guards.

The training programs of State Guard units were continually hampered by the high turnover of personnel experienced by most units throughout the war. While State Guard pre-induction training was valuable to the individual proceeding into the Army, the continuing intake of men kept the recruit squads full and caused State Guard units to devote an inordinate amount of time to basic individual training. As the war became increasingly remote from the home front, a further training problem arose: training for routine internal security duties became boring and seemingly irrelevant as the war drew to a close. Attendance at weekly drills, never compulsory, suffered in many states. Even states with high attendance figures, such as New York, suffered near the end of hostilities.

Figures 19 and 20 show attendance figures at different periods in California and New York.

Figure 19

CALIFORNIA STATE GUARD DRILL ATTENDANCE, AUG 1944-DEC 1945

		Mustered Enlisted Strength	Drill Attendance
1944	August	9,842	53%
	September	9,645	47
	October	9,678	48
	November	9,723	46
	December	9,797	47
1945	January	9,583	49
	February	9,376	51
	March	9,317	49
	April	9,202	49
	May	8,894	48
	June	8,586	46
	July	8,351	45
	August	7,995	43
	September	7,911	43
	October	7,280	40
	November	6,898	38
	December	6,532	37

* *History of the California State Guard*, pp. 100 and 136.

Figure 20

NEW YORK (STATE) GUARD STRENGTH AND ATTENDANCE AT ARMOR DRILLS¹

	Avg	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1941													
Total Strength	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Attendance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Number	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,996
Percent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,455
													89.0
1942													
Total Strength	16,140	15,760	16,374	16,376	16,432	16,737	16,646	16,434	16,152	16,430	16,654	16,427	16,584
Attendance													
Number	13,854	13,775	14,099	14,211	14,194	14,417	14,338	14,166	13,246	13,894	13,945	13,508	13,604
Percent	85.8	87.4	86.1	86.7	86.2	86.1	86.1	86.2	83.9	84.6	83.7	82.2	82.0
1943													
Total Strength	15,769	16,309	16,415	16,657	16,974	17,051	17,218	16,945	16,772	16,844	16,797	16,753	16,578
Attendance													
Number	14,221	13,548	13,746	14,212	14,495	14,787	14,837	14,579	14,502	14,268	14,173	14,245	13,778
Percent	84.8	83.1	83.7	85.3	85.4	86.7	86.2	86.0	86.2	84.7	84.4	85.0	83.1
1944													
Total Strength	16,771	16,313	16,105	15,845	15,663	16,229	16,782	16,534	16,354	17,715	18,142	18,482	18,555
Attendance													
Number	14,169	13,705	13,585	13,452	13,620	14,143	14,606	14,175	14,562	14,592	15,061	15,203	15,307
Percent	84.5	84.0	84.4	85.1	86.9	87.1	87.0	85.7	88.4	82.3	83.0	82.2	82.4
1945													
Total Strength	18,848	18,275	18,315	18,626	18,839	19,253	19,935	20,247	17,322	18,874	19,195	18,676	18,177
Attendance													
Number	15,208	14,687	15,266	15,313	15,555	15,966	16,579	16,584	15,110	14,520	14,494	14,120	13,867
Percent	80.6	80.3	83.3	82.2	82.5	82.9	83.1	81.9	81.1	76.9	75.5	75.6	76.0
1946													
Total Strength	17,003	17,593	16,966	16,832	16,698	16,834	17,202	17,267	16,243	16,961	17,427	17,141	-
Attendance													
Number	13,333	13,574	13,040	13,214	13,008	13,444	13,708	13,727	12,371	13,253	13,409	13,176	-
Percent	78.4	77.1	76.8	78.5	77.9	79.8	79.6	79.4	74.1	78.1	76.9	76.8	-

¹From Annual Reports of the Adjutant General, New York, for the years 1942 to 1946.²Figure incomplete.

Finance

The cost of the State Guards was initially to be met entirely by the states. In contrast to the funding of the National Guard, federal legislation and regulations establishing the State Guards did not authorize the War Department to spend money on them, and limited federal issues to individual weapons and accoutrements. In the prewar organizational period, state appropriations were generally adequate to cover drill pay, training expenses, and the cost of obsolescent equipment, uniforms, cloth, weapons, and vehicles from federal and other sources. More often the problem was to find sufficient quantities available for purchase.

The crisis after Pearl Harbor created two new difficulties. First, the states immediately increased requisitions for supplies for their expanded forces beyond the capacity of the depleted stocks of obsolescent federal materiel. The War Department asked for a \$1,999,134 supplemental appropriation in 1942 for the purchase of equipment for State Guards. The Bureau of the Budget rejected the request because such an expenditure was not authorized by law. Second, the necessity for paying thousands of State Guardsmen on full-time active duty during 1942 and part of 1943 placed a heavy and unexpected strain on the budgets of several of the coastal states. A military expenditure of \$6.4 million in one year was a major consideration in California's decision to return its State Guard to inactive training status in mid-1943.

The War Department was able, however, to assist the states in another way, by providing funds for training. In August 1942 the Army Chief of Staff provided \$500,000 from his contingent fund, of which one-half was allotted to the service commands, for training literature, State Guard schools, additional training aids, expendable supplies not otherwise obtainable, demonstrations and field exercises, and transportation of AUS instructors. Subsequently such assistance was regularized. An amendment to Section 61 of the National Defense Act of 1916, approved 26 June 1944, authorized the Secretary of War to "use appropriations for the Military Establishment for any expenses of the United States incident to the training

of the military forces authorized by this subsection except for pay, subsistence, medical care and treatment, [or] transportation of members of such military forces between their homes and the place of such training." In keeping with the increased emphasis late in the war on the improvement of state forces' capabilities, the estimates for federal assistance for State Guard training were \$189,701 for FY 1945, and \$346,107 for FY 1946. ³¹

State expenditures for all items connected with State Guards were of course much greater as shown in Figure 21.

Figure 21
STATE GUARD APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES, 1941-1946*

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Mustered Strength</u>	<u>Cost Per Man</u>
Total expenditures to 30 June 1944	\$47,442,731.04		
Expenditures for 1 July 1943-30 June 1944	18,654,458.54	164,519	\$113.37
Appropriated for year 1 July 1944-30 June 1945	17,943,056.80	151,308	109.06
Appropriated for year 1 July 1945-30 June 1946	19,467,507.44	115,541	118.33

* From AR, NGB, 1946, Appendix M, pp. 304-305.

These figures included the cost of field training camps, state-directed schools, and maneuvers; pay for armory drills, active duty, and field training; training manuals, films, and other aids; motor vehicles, uniforms, arms, and ammunition. The amounts spent or appropriated varied considerably from state to state.

³¹ AR, NGB, 1946, Appendix L, p. 303.

CHAPTER III

HOME DEFENSE IN THE KOREAN WAR

The state military forces of World War I and World War II performed their duties as part of full-scale national efforts. When the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 confronted the United States with a new conflict, the military authorities of the states responded with plans for home defense forces based on the experience of World War II. Yet the federal policy did not allow full reestablishment of the State Guards for the Korean War. Manpower policy during the war was complicated, and called for only a partial mobilization of the Army National Guard, the component whose place the State Guards were intended to take. The federal government prepared the basic legislative and administrative preliminaries for full-scale organization of state forces in 1950 and 1951, but did not proceed further, in spite of the pleas of several states.

The State Guards of World War II had undergone a slow process of demobilization. During the latter part of the war, state and federal officials recognized that they would have to be retained for a time after the cessation of hostilities, because the National Guard, as had happened after World War I, would not return to the states as functioning units. Legislative authority for State Guards would be withdrawn only when the National Guard organization was sufficiently reconstituted in the states.

Various states accordingly conducted State Guard recruiting drives and attempted to maintain standards of training during 1945 and 1946. The state of Washington in 1944 shifted its policy from recruiting older men to younger, in order to provide a potential source of manpower that would be interested in transferring to the National Guard. A Louisiana State Guard conference in January 1946 outlined plans for the State Guard to assist in securing enlistments for the National Guard among both returning servicemen and youths who had not yet been called by selective service.

State Guard organizations during 1946 and 1947 generally deactivated companies in smaller towns without armories first, while the armory-based units gradually doubled up with new National Guard formations prior to disbandment. In most states the two organizations remained distinct during the transition. This was in line with federal policy on State Guards. They had been authorized for the wartime emergency, and should not continue to exist for longer than necessary. Their members were generally too old, and their equipment too light and obsolescent, for the War Department to consider converting State Guard units directly into National Guard formations; nor was their geographical distribution appropriate for such a measure.

The one exception to these developments was the New York Guard. New York planned as early as 1943 to use its State Guard organization as the nucleus for the reorganization of its National Guard. Its State Guard units were enthusiastic, and in 1945 made up the usual personnel losses by vigorously recruiting over 1,000 discharged AUS enlisted men. Mustered strength on 31 December 1946 was 16,680 with a continuing high average attendance at drills. The structure of the New York Guard was reorganized effective 1 January 1946 into four (later two) infantry divisions, complete with support elements and artillery brigades, in order to convert the subordinate units into National Guards as soon as federal allotments, recognition, and new equipment were secured. (The State Guard infantry regiments earmarked for the artillery brigades were to remain as infantry until the final National Guard organization was settled.) Units were scheduled for conversion in seven groups, so that administrative disruption would impair the efficiency of only a fraction of the state's emergency forces at any one time. Personnel with previous federal service joined at the ranks they had held during the war. The state authorities felt that this plan not only provided an orderly means of setting up National Guard units and a way of attracting men with war experience to state service during the transition, but also avoided the gradual disintegration of the State Guards before the need for them had passed. ³²

³² *Annual Report of the Adjutant General, New York, for the years 1943, 1945, 1946.*

The policies of New York State notwithstanding, the federal government terminated the State Guard program during 1947. The War Department ceased the issue of federal property for State Guards on 31 December 1946, except for some items purchased by the states. By 30 June 1947, the remaining State Guards mustered only 33,785 men in 23 states (of which New York counted 12,225). A Congressional resolution, effective 25 July 1947, repealed Section 61 (b) of the National Defense Act of 1916, amendments passed since 1940 authorizing the maintenance of state forces in place of the National Guard, and the provision of federal guidance and equipment to such forces. Retention of only the original 1916 wording of Section 61 in effect restored the prohibition of state military forces other than the National Guard in time of peace. The states disbanded virtually all of their units by the end of 1947. Disposition of federal property in State Guard hands was completed in 1948. Neither the National Defense Act passed in August 1947, nor the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense, contained any provisions for State Guard forces.

Federal and state authorities had agreed that State Guards should be maintained until the National Guard could assume the responsibility for internal security. The federal government was content to disband the State Guards when this was achieved. Opinion in some states went beyond this, however, to advocacy of some form of permanent armed state auxiliary force.

The Adjutant General of Ohio recommended that the State Guard clauses of the state military laws be retained, and that Ohio congressmen should seek to retain in the National Defense Act a provision allowing the states to maintain a military organization that would be available immediately upon any federalization of the National Guard. He also believed that the state's untested wartime civil defense organization had been unsound, and that a State Guard reserve subject to the Articles of War was a better solution. ³³

³³ *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Ohio, 1946, pp. 21-22.*

New York actually created a purely state military organization in peacetime as a by-product of the reorganization of its National Guard. In November 1946 the governor approved the formation of the State War-Disaster Military Corps (SWDMC), which was intended to absorb members of the State Guard who were unable to qualify for federal recognition in the National Guard. With a projected peacetime strength of 4,000, the SWDMC had the peacetime mission of supplementing the New York National Guard in dealing with disasters and disturbances. In wartime it was to provide civil defense-style disaster relief in the event of guided missile or bombing attacks, and to form a cadre for expansion into larger State Guard units to replace the National Guard upon federalization. The SWDMC was administered by local National Guard headquarters, received similar training in riot control and disaster relief, and had uniforms and armory privileges. The Corps never attracted many volunteers, and was disbanded sometime between 1947 and 1949.³⁴

The Texas State Guard Association, one of many formed during the war, was more persistent. The Texas State Guard was disbanded in 1947, but the Association favored the maintenance of some kind of state force. A law sponsored by the Association not only authorized but activated the Texas State Guard Reserve Corps on 26 January 1948. This was a cadre organization of officers and enlisted men trained to expand into a full-strength State Guard in the event of mobilization. Strictly speaking, the formation of the Texas State Guard Reserve violated the federal Constitution. The states were permitted to have enabling legislation and plans for non-federal military forces, but federal authorization for such organizations to train actively had lapsed with the repeal of Section 61 (b) of the National Defense Act in 1947.

No other state went as far as Texas, but the worsening of the cold war impelled several of them to update plans for reserve military forces, as part of a general reconsideration of the problems of civil defense. Kentucky drew up a complete organization plan for its Active Militia in January 1949. The Ohio Defense Corps was established in May 1949; a minimum cadre for five regiments was recruited within a month. As early as

³⁴ *Annual Report of the Adjutant General, New York, 1946*, pp. 45 and 48; New York AGO, "Historical Background of the New York Guard."

December 1947, under provisions of the California Military and Veterans Code, the state adjutant general provided for the creation of reserve areas, units, and lists of potential volunteers. Amendments to the code in October 1949 authorized more detailed advance planning for a California Defense and Security Corps.

The state's two National Guard division commanders were assigned responsibility for the organization of state reserve forces. Volunteers were invited to attend California National Guard assemblies and exercises. No units were activated, however.

The concept of home defense forces received federal reconsideration in 1949 and 1950, as a result of studies of federal and state civil defense responsibilities, conducted by the National Security Council, the Defense Department, and other federal agencies. It was generally agreed that state internal security duties were only semi-military functions. Whatever force was created to perform them should not be organized along the lines of combat units merely because it would be taking the place of National Guard formations, whose military character derived from their federal mission.

In January 1949 the National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with the Office of the Provost Marshal General, prepared a preliminary study on the use of state troops in internal security. This was circulated to 30 state adjutants general for comment. State authorities were understandably favorable to having internal security units as part of their future civil defense organizations, although most pointed out that the federal government would have to bear most of the cost of equipment and maintenance (and by implication, that if the federal government instigated the formation of such units additional to the states' National Guard requirements, it was obligated to pay their entire cost). Some states felt that State Guard-type units might compete with the National Guard for personnel and facilities, and that there was not sufficient interest to maintain complete state troop organizations in peacetime. A follow-up National Guard Bureau study in March 1949 suggested the formation of cadre internal security forces administered as a separate element of the National Guard system.³⁵ The federal government

³⁵See Appendix C, "National Guard Internal Security Force.

would provide drill and field training pay, as well as arms, equipment and uniforms in the event of mobilization. Federal regulations would assure uniform organization, personnel standards, and training. These recommendations would have given the states most of what they wanted, and several features of the plan turned up again in similar measures advocated by the National Guard Association and state military authorities at the beginning of the Korean War.

At the time the report was submitted, however, the Army chose not to adopt the suggestions of the National Guard Bureau. The Operations and Training Division of the General Staff concluded that the states would prefer military forces to additional police reserve units during emergencies, although the former might be redundant now that many of their disaster relief functions were being allotted to civil organizations under the developing concepts of civil defense responsibilities. The National Guard Bureau had not been particularly successful in controlling the activities of State Guards when performing state missions; the Army should probably do no more than advise the states in future. It was desirable to prepare plans for state troops in advance of mobilization, and to provide legislative sanction for cadre forces in peacetime. Since these forces were intended to perform state missions, the states, rather than the Department of the Army, should initiate legislation in Congress. Finally, observed the Operations and Training Division, the cost of the proposed program was too great to be supported in peacetime, and the full allotment of equipment would be unavailable at a time of general mobilization.³⁶ The Department of the Army limited itself to cooperative planning and liaison with the states, and the promise to furnish arms, ammunition, clothing, and equipment as available without interfering with the requirements of the armed forces.

Some analysts looked more closely at the record of World War II, and questioned the utility of part-time, State Guard-type organizations in two primary home defense roles, riot control, and the protection of installations against sabotage. An Army G-3 study of April 1950 on State Guards and internal security observed that World War II State Guards had been unsuitable for continuous guard duty. Federal troops had performed better

³⁶ "Proposed State Internal Security Units," D/O&T, 8 September 1949.

than Michigan State Guards in suppressing riots in Detroit in 1943. Both roles were more properly minimum-force, police functions, the report said, and might be better performed by augmented state police organizations, with federal combat troops available as a last-resort reinforcement. The National Guard Bureau in a response raised legislative and practical objections to expanding the functions of state police while depriving the governors of military forces under their direct control. The Bureau recommended that the Department of the Army encourage the formation of both state police and State Guard units, particularly military police units.³⁷

The discussion of the future role of state troops produced some useful preliminary work on new tables of organization and equipment for internal security forces, along with surveys of state military opinion. The main issues of the value and structure of home defense organizations in peace and war were unresolved, however, when North Korea launched its attack on 24 June 1950.

The Korean emergency quickly developed into a large scale conflict, but not one that required full-scale mobilization. From the outset the Department of Defense hoped to avoid calling up the entire Army National Guard. Individual states were therefore uncertain of the extent to which they would need additional home defense forces. Four National Guard divisions from Oklahoma, California, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont, along with numerous non-divisional units from many states, were alerted during July and August 1950, and federalized in September. During this period the states could only make plans for home defense forces, commence organization, and enlist cadres, as provided by appropriate state military laws. Active organization had to await re-enactment of federal legislative authorization for state forces and the release of federal arms and equipment. The Department of the Army in the first week of September 1950 denied a request of the Adjutant General of Maryland for 2,000 rifles because it had no authority to issue them.

³⁷ "State Guards and Internal Security," enclosure in AC/S G-3 to Chief, NGB, 28 April 1950; Letter, Chief, NGB, to AC/S G-3 Operations Division, North American Branch, 10 May 1950.

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The National Guard Association faced the problem in August 1950 by sponsoring legislation in both houses of Congress to amend Section 61 of the National Defense Act. The provisions of the Senate bill, S. 4088, went beyond the World War II State Guard clauses of Section 61 (b) in several respects. The bill allowed cadres of state military forces in addition to the National Guard to be maintained at all times. The Army was not only to furnish arms, equipment, and uniforms, but also to pay state forces and cadre for attendance at armory drills and field training. Service in any such units would normally be considered state service, however, except that state forces could be called into federal service as units in case of extreme emergency. The National Guard Bureau would not only promulgate Army directives and regulations pertaining to state forces, but also function as the sole channel of communication between the Department of the Army and the states. The provisions of the bill would be permanent, not a wartime measure.³⁸

The Senate Armed Services Committee recognized the necessity of establishing some kind of home defense forces in view of the rapid federalization of many National Guard units. The fact that the current session of Congress was coming to a close in September added to the urgency. The imminent recess caused problems for the bill. Congress had not expected to consider and enact universal military training and other emergency military legislation so soon. Moreover, it was awaiting an outline proposal for a civil defense establishment from the National Security Resources Board, which might affect the status of home defense forces. The time was thus inappropriate for study of a state forces program containing significant new features. The Senate subcommittee's solution to meet the immediate need for federal authorization was to replace the National Guard Association's bill with one calling for reenactment of the form of Section 61 (a) and (b) that had been in effect during World War II. The new law would run for two years, during which time Congress could consider a more elaborate state forces law if necessary.

³⁸ 87th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1 September 1950 vol. 116, pp. 23-25.

The House Armed Services Committee hearings on the companion (H.R. 9531) to the National Guard Association's bill brought out the views of both the Department of the Army and the National Guard Association.³⁹ Army spokesmen recognized the immediate difficulty facing the states whose National Guard units were being called into federal service, but observed that, in its broadest scope, internal security was not entirely a military problem, and that long-range studies might find that military forces, state or federal, were not the most suitable organizations to perform internal security missions.

In any event, two provisions of the bill were unacceptable to the Army under prevailing conditions. First, the bill placed the National Guard Bureau in charge of planning and coordinating internal security measures with the states. This went against the long-standing Army practice of coordinating its defense planning with state and local authorities on a decentralized basis, through the six continental army commanders and their subordinate field agencies.⁴⁰ Second, in the Army view the federal government should not have a close financial relationship with state forces. State forces should receive sub-standard or obsolete equipment as free issues in order to eliminate the requirement for federal inspection and maintenance. More important, state forces should not receive federal pay. The provision of federal pay and maintenance would mean in effect that the federal government assumed primary responsibility for the internal security mission. This was inconsistent with portions of the bill which left the states in control of actual operations.

Speaking on behalf of the National Guard Association, Major General Reckord, the Adjutant General of Maryland, was satisfied with the substitution of the wording of the World War II law as an interim measure to secure the immediate requirement of federal authorization. He hoped to present a new permanent bill in the next session after further conferences with the Department of the Army. In regard to future consideration of a permanent act, General Reckord thought it unfortunate that the Senate's temporary bill extended Section 61 for two years instead of one. The Senate bill was approved by both houses and became Public law 849 on 27 September 1950.

³⁹ 81st Congress, House Armed Services Committee Hearings, 18 September 1950, vol. 32, pp. 7425-7439.

⁴⁰ Regional Army commands had replaced the prewar and wartime corps area and service commands.

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The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Haislip, presented the Army view on state forces and discussed tentative tables of organization at the annual convention of the National Guard Association in Washington in October. General Haislip explained that the Army hoped to limit state guard organizations to planning at that time because of the demand for money and materiel, and that perhaps efforts should be concentrated on the development of civil defense organizations and police reserves. The Chief of Staff of New York and other state leaders continued to press for the creation of units with combat capabilities.⁴¹

Several states were already well advanced in the organization of military forces by the autumn of 1950. Texas activated the State Guard Reserve and authorized its units to enlist to 50 percent strength. Oregon recruited complete cadres for three regiments of National Guard Reserve. Tables of organization for the California Defense and Security Corps (re-designated the California National Guard Reserve in May 1951) were approved in July 1950. The state adjutant general established CDSC headquarters and two division headquarters on 15 August, one day after the first units of the California National Guard entered federal service.

Acting on the incorrect assumption that one of its National Guard divisions would receive early call to active duty, New York State had begun to organize cadres for the New York Guard in July 1950. Plans approved in August provided for two area commands, counterparts of the National Guard division headquarters; five zone commands, corresponding to state civil defense subdivisions; and six or eight group headquarters, corresponding to regiments. In a departure from World War II practice, the largest tactical units were designated internal security battalions, as recommended by the federal government. Cadre strength totalled 486 by December 1950.

Several other states reached the stage of cadre organization, including Hawaii, Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode Island. Hoping eventually to recruit 500 men in three regiments, the Connecticut State Guard Reserve Brigade enrolled 90 percent of its required officers and 300 NCO's by October 1950.

⁴¹ Maj. Gen. K.F. Hausauer to Gen. Haislip, 20 November 1950.

Three states projected large home defense forces, but proceeded no farther than the planning stage. Pennsylvania planned an 18,000 man force of six infantry regiments and supporting troops. Massachusetts projected 8,000 to 10,000 men, and Illinois planned for 15,000, in 30 battalions.

Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont also prepared plans, but held back from actually appropriating funds, recruiting cadres, or organizing units, even after the passage of the federal enabling act satisfied the constitutional requirement for the formation of state forces. Some waited to see what proportion of their National Guard units would be federalized. Even active states such as New York, California, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut were forced to await the development of federal policies on the amount of assistance to be provided to state forces.

The Army was preoccupied with the uneven mobilization of combat forces in the winter and spring of 1950-51. Light divisions and many smaller units of the Army National Guard were federalized by mid-1951, but up to that time it was uncertain whether the pace of activation would continue at such a rate until all units were called (eventually, approximately 34 percent of Guard ground units were mobilized). In December 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided not to provide supplies and equipment for state internal security forces for the time being, in view of the growing demands for money and materiel. The National Guard Bureau accordingly preferred to plan to assist a full-scale organization of 200,000 state internal security troops, but not to implement it unless there should be total mobilization of the National Guard. This did nothing to solve the problems of certain states which had given up from forty to eighty percent of their National Guard strengths.

Connecticut submitted a requisition to the National Guard Bureau for 4,000 rifles with ammunition in January 1951. The Department of the Army returned the requisition in March without action, pending development of a plan by the National Security Resources Board for federal assistance in organizing reserves to cope with state and local security missions. By May approximately 8,000 Connecticut National Guard troops were in federal service, with only 1,781 remaining in the state. State statutes required an armed force of at least 2,500 men. At that time the three regiments

of the State Guard Reserve mustered approximately 1,800 officers and men, uniformed and partially equipped at state expense. The force still lacked weapons, ammunition, and motor transport.⁴²

Continuing pressure from the states resulted in the publication of a new Army Regulation (AR 915-10 of 14 May 1951) on general policies for State Guards, and accompanying tables of organization, T/O 19-56 for State Guard internal security battalion, and T/O 19-57 for State Guard internal security company. No corresponding tables of equipment were issued. AR 915-10 did not differ substantially from AR 850-250 of World War II, except for the explicit statement that "by organization, equipment, and training, State Guards are designed and qualified for law enforcement operations, rather than for sustained combat operations against hostile armed forces."

State authorities could take little comfort in the publication of the State Guard regulations. The defense budget for 1951 did not ask for appropriations to equip state units. Moreover, the publication of AR 915-10 and the tables of organization was preceded by the announcement of an alternate plan for internal security, which was evolved by the Department of the Army during April 1951.

Revised AR 850-250 on State Guards will be issued in near future to implement Public Law 849, 81st Congress, and outline organization, training, uniforms, and equipment for State Guard units. D/A desires to keep State Guard in cadre and planning stage at this time. Plans being developed to organize temporary National Guard units in States which have lost a substantial percentage of their National Guard to provide units for National Guard personnel returning from active duty. These units can be utilized while available as any other National Guard unit for purposes such as internal security.⁴³

The general policy was to allot these temporary units to states whose National Guard strength had been reduced below 40 percent, if the states requested them. Legislation was necessary to establish such units, which

⁴² Connecticut Governor John Lodge to Acting Chief, NGB, 17 May 1951.

⁴³ Acting Chief, NGB, to all state adjutants general, 11 May 1951.

would be federally recognized, equipped, and paid. The original plan designated the units as "carrier battalions", which would be abolished upon the return of federalized troops and units.

By May 1951 the National Security Council and the Defense Department had in fact decided that the predominant state need was for non-military civil defense forces as wartime reserves under the supervision of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Further action on State Guard-type units would be a duplication of effort and a waste of manpower.⁴⁴

Legislation incorporating the carrier battalion concept was not introduced in Congress until 1952. Some states eligible to receive the units were willing by the end of 1951 both to continue to hold plans for organizing State Guards in abeyance, and to wait for the legislation. The Korean conflict had not developed into a third world war against communism, and the threat of sabotage was minimal. No more National Guard units were being called into federal service. The Department of the Army generally tried to station military police battalions in the States whose National Guard divisions were serving overseas. It also authorized the organization of a few new permanent National Guard anti-aircraft artillery battalions in understrength states, for instance, in Vermont. Surplus anti-aircraft units began returning from overseas as well early in 1952.

These developments did not apply to a few states which had not lost 60 percent of their National Guard strength, but wished nevertheless to organize complete home defense forces. In particular, California and New York (which retained 80 percent of its Army National Guard) petitioned Congress in 1951 and 1952 to provide federal assistance. In September 1951 California reorganized its National Guard Reserve structure into two divisions, each with a full table of organization of 6,784 officers and men, and a cadre strength allowance of 1,815. By June 1952 the CNGR had organized over 125 units, with an aggregate strength of more than 2,700 men. The state budgeted over one and a half million dollars for uniforms,

⁴⁴ Memo, "Provision of State Internal Security Forces," Sec. of Army, to Sec. of Defense, 31 May 1951.

field manuals, and training exercises. Some reserve members supplied and equipped themselves. Weekly armory drills covered internal security subjects such as domestic disturbances and traffic control.⁴⁵

Failing to secure the federal assistance seemingly implied by the publication of AR 915-10, the New York Guard spent \$417,772 for clothing and equipment (including 250 pistols) during 1951. It also made preliminary arrangements for the purchase of rifles or riot guns from commercial manufacturers. By December 1951 the New York Guard had organized 116 company cadres, with a total mustered strength of 1,176 officers and men, most of them World War II veterans.⁴⁶

Federal action completed the development of temporary National Guard units for the provision of partial internal security in some states. Internal security by this time was in any case a secondary objective; the primary purpose of the relevant legislation introduced in 1952 was to provide an orderly means of releasing National Guard personnel after two years of active duty, without returning their units to the states. The carrier unit proposal accordingly appeared as part of a bill to amend the Universal Military Training Act. The main provision authorized the retention in active service of the unit designations and equipment of Army and Air National Guard units for five years. The individual guardsmen in these organizations were to be released after 24 months active duty. This enabled the Army to avoid bringing divisions, and their equipment, back from overseas, and replacing them with newly created federal divisions. In April 1952 the bill underwent considerable modifications, including the elimination of the carrier units to receive the returning guardsmen. A plan proposed by the Army G-3 substituted permission for the states to organize divisional and nondivisional National Guard units with the same designation as their formations currently in federal service, but distinguished from the original units by the suffix NGUS. This would give the new units a sense of historical identity in their local communities, which would promote the retention of personnel. NGUS units would be federally equipped with light weapons. The bill authorized recruiting up to a cadre strength of 50 percent officers and 25 percent enlisted men. The National Guard

⁴⁵ *Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of California, 1950-1952*, pp. 112-114.

⁴⁶ New York Division of Military and Naval Affairs, *Annual Report, 1951*, pp. 121-122.

Association and all but five States -- Iowa, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, and Virginia -- endorsed the measure, which became Public Law 461, 82nd Congress, on 7 July 1952.⁴⁷ The NGUS units that were organized subsequently were absorbed by the parent units upon their return to state control.

Federal authority for state home defense forces expired in September 1952 at the end of its two-year term. Most state forces disbanded their cadres. A few continued on an unarmed basis, or maintained small staff planning sections within state military headquarters. After World War II the Army had never objected in principle to a change in the law to allow for the voluntary maintenance of cadre state military organizations in addition to the National Guard, as long as federal funds were not obligated for their support. Accordingly, Congress passed a permanent amendment to Section 61 in 1956 (further amended in 1958), which permits voluntary maintenance of such organizations. It remains the statute governing state defense forces as Title 32, Section 109, US Code.

⁴⁷ 82nd Congress, House Armed Services Committee Hearings, 6 May 1952, vol. 38, pp. 3821-1829.

CHAPTER IV

Comment

World War I found the President empowered to call the National Guard units from the states into federal service, train them, and ship them overseas. But both the federal government and the state governments were inadequately prepared to provide replacements for the functions performed locally by the National Guard in peacetime.

Even the legality of establishing home defense forces other than a police or constabulary force was not clarified until after the National Guard troops had been removed. In retrospect it seems obvious that this should have been anticipated, at least during the Mexican border crisis, particularly since Europe was already at war. At the time, however, it undoubtedly was considered a minor problem in comparison with those facing a nation trying to avoid war.

Each state sought to provide for home defense according to its own requirements, with the result that no two found the same solution. Inadequate anticipation was unfortunate, but, although for the historian the existence of 48 varieties of home defense forces is difficult, in view of the fact that they were tailored for the local situations they may well have been more successful than a standard type of organization could have been.

As might have been expected, the mostly highly organized defense forces were formed in the industrialized and most exposed states on the east coast, where the greatest problems threatened.

Enlisting men for any of these forces seems not to have been a problem, but retaining those that were of draft age was in many states a constant problem. Some states avoided it by drawing on those overage or otherwise unqualified. The fact that those called up by selective service had received some military training, however, proved to be an advantage to them, and to the Army, and indeed providing such basic training was considered to be a main function of home defense forces in some states.

The competition with the federal government for arms and equipment at the beginning of the war, and the restriction of qualification under the Home Guard Act, resulted to a large extent in local forces, locally equipped. As a visible way of contributing to the war effort it may be assumed that local involvement in many cases was a positive factor,

Only a few internal crises occurred during the brief time the United States was actively engaged in World War I, and many home defense troops were never involved in anything more demanding than training, promoting war bonds, and marching in parades. The records indicate, however, that on those occasions when such troops were needed they performed well.

The home defense forces of World War II were more mature organizations than those of World War I. The federalization of the National Guard during the year of uneasy peace before Pearl Harbor superficially resembled the call-up of the Guard for the Mexican border operations of 1916, but the federal government in 1940 and 1941 made much more systematic preparations for the establishment of substitute state military forces. Of particular importance is the fact that the Congress clarified the legal position of state forces in peacetime, and directed the states to exercise control over armed volunteer groups within their jurisdiction. The State Guards of World War II accordingly developed within a more uniform framework than did the varied home defense organizations of World War I.

Federal supervision of home defense force matters was initially not much more extensive than in World War I, the result of the War Department's concentration on alleviating its own shortages of equipment, and its wish to let the states manage a traditional responsibility. After war was declared in 1941, however, the feeling that the United States was directly threatened with attack greatly increased federal participation in the State Guard program.

First, the War Department designated two new missions for state forces. For a time after Pearl Harbor, states were encouraged to provide troops for full-time guard duty in vital areas, and to train their units to act as auxiliaries to federal forces in the event of enemy raids or invasion. These significant additions to their functions briefly gave the State Guards a

combat character that had never been envisaged in World War I and was rejected at the time of the Korean War.

Second, the scale and type of federal materiel and training assistance to state forces expanded as the war progressed. The initial modest allotment of rifles in 1940 was extended by 1945 to include the bulk of State Guard arms, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, and vehicles. Through the provision of training facilities, schools, inspectors, financial resources, and suggested courses of instruction by the service commands, the War Department in practice controlled the conduct of State Guard training.

Third, the Army worked more closely with state military organizations than it had in World War I, although the theoretical separation of state and federal military organizations was preserved. Army regulations rather artificially maintained throughout World War II the official division of state and federal responsibility for operational planning. Originally no joint operations were envisaged; nor did State Guards have any federal missions. Accordingly federal commanders officially exercised no more direct control over state forces than they had in World War I. Developments after Pearl Harbor nevertheless produced a blurring and overlapping of functions. State authorities voluntarily accepted the direction of the commanding generals of the service commands in coordinating joint missions, and in integrating state emergency procedures into federal territorial defense plans.

One notable development in the World War II State Guard program was the emergence of the service command headquarters as the decentralized principal federal executive agencies for all of the above activities, supply, training, inspection, finance, planning, and operations.

Several features of the State Guards of World War II reflected the same experience as that of home defense forces in World War I. There was still great diversity in the command structures of state forces, and in the provisions from state to state for enlistment qualifications, drill pay, clothing allowances, and other terms of service. Many of the emergency duties actually performed in both wars were much the same, although the longer duration of World War II presented more opportunities for disaster duties and civil disorders. Near the end of both wars home defense forces

had some difficulty in retaining the interest of their members, and attendance dropped. Finally, wartime state military organizations were maintained for a considerable time after the cessation of hostilities in both 1918 and 1945, in order to ensure the preservation of law and order until new National Guard units could take their place.

Two difficulties experienced by the short-lived home defense forces of World War I became major problems for the State Guards of World War II. Shortages of equipment hampered the initial organization of State Guard units and retarded their development until 1943. The high turnover of State Guard manpower throughout the war significantly affected the organizational integrity and training proficiency of units.

A third problem occurred only in World War II, when State Guards in some states were called on for guard duty for prolonged periods. This requirement caused so many problems that the unsuitability of part-time duty forces for continuous duty for many days was clearly demonstrated.

The Korean War revealed differences of opinion between state and federal authorities on the role and organization of home defense forces. The issues raised, however, were not developed, partly because only a portion of the National Guard was federalized. The outbreak of fighting in Korea came when an inconclusive examination of state forces within the general framework of civil defense was in progress. Once war began, the state naturally wished to secure an improved version of the World War II State Guard structure. The legislative proposal of the National Guard Association would have achieved virtually a full federal underwriting of the home defense force program. The Department of the Army opposed the measure; the temporary renewal of enabling authority on the same basis as in World War II prevented further consideration of the plan.

With only a portion of the National Guard mobilized during the conflict, federal authorities found it simpler not to proceed with the full organization of home defense forces. The small amount of federal contingency planning for home defense forces that was done definitely assigned only internal security functions to state troops, with no combat role.

The experience with home defense forces in the two world wars, supplemented by the negative evidence of the Korean War, reveals several

factors which affected the development of state military organizations and without planning based on experience could cause similar problems in a future war.

The necessity of providing even obsolescent arms and equipment for adequate home defense forces placed a significant burden on a state's finances. On the other hand, dependence on federal equipment, whether free issue, loaned, or purchased, posed another problem, for home defense forces inevitably had low priority for allotment of equipment when supplies were short. During the Korean War even the states that were anxious to develop home defense forces limited themselves to cadres for the most part because of the problem of arms and equipment. The most important requirement for expansion of home defense forces in a future emergency is provision for supplying arms and equipment sufficient to outfit projected full strength units.

The hardship caused by calling on part-time duty home defense forces for extended periods of active duty was considerable and affected recruitment as well as morale and effectiveness. The partial solution was found in organization of a few permanent-duty companies or battalions.

Finally, home defense forces suffered considerably from the high percentage of turnovers, primarily as a result of enrolling volunteers among the age groups liable for induction into the armed forces. Although the payoff for this problem was to be found in the advantage gained upon enrollment in the Army by those who received preliminary training in home defense forces, the constant problem of trying to maintain something close to full strength was significant. Restriction of volunteers to age groups not subject to call only partially alleviated the problem since the voluntary nature of home defense duty made it easy for members to drop out. It may be concluded that any home defense organization relying on voluntary enlistments would probably experience a rapid turnover in membership regardless of whether or not conscription was in effect for the armed forces.

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

STATE COUNCILS SECTION

February 9, 1918.

Subject: Transmittal of Syllabus and Report on Home Guards.

Dear Sir:

I have your letter of February 3, 1918.

In response to your request I am sending you herewith a copy of our syllabus of important State war emergency legislation already enacted by State Legislatures. This syllabus is a compilation of legislation already enacted and not a recommendation or even endorsement by the Council of National Defense of any laws contained therein, and is sent out only upon request of the State Councils of Defense. I have tried, however, in our statement as to State Home Guard statutes to incorporate the ideas which you expressed to me in our conversation several weeks ago.

I am also sending you a report on Home Guards and similar bodies which has been drawn up for use of field representatives in the Section of the Council. The report is confidential in its nature so I think that there can be no impropriety in the reference to the War Department. Appended to the introductory discussion is an outline of the various types so far as we have information from the laws enacted by the State Legislatures in 1917 and reports received from State Councils of Defense.

Yours very truly,

Louis W. McKernan

Member of Section.

Enclosures.

Mr. J. McI. Carter, Brig. General, National Army,
Chief, Militia Bureau,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

*File
J.W.H.*

REPORT ON ORGANIZATION AND TYPES OF HOME
GUARDS AND SIMILAR BODIES.

General Discussion and Summary

The formation of State constabularies or Home Guards for the protection of public and private property within the States is desirable, but reserves for the filling up of the Federal forces are amply provided for by the Federal Statutes such as the Act authorizing the President to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States, Public - No. 12 - 65th Congress, H. R. 3545.

The War Department has received innumerable requests from the States to furnish soldiers to guard private property within the States. It is impossible for the Department to grant these requests, and it is primarily to obviate the necessity for such requests that the formation of State constabularies and Home Guards is desirable. The War Department has been compelled during the period of the present war, to send Federal troops to certain States where there was not adequate Home Guard or State constabulary to protect industries indispensable to the prosecution of the war, such for instance as copper mining. If a strong police force were organized in each of the States in the nature of a Home Guard, such action on the part of the Federal Government would be unnecessary. It is obviously detrimental to the military forces of the country thus to take troops from those available for active service and place them on guard duty.

in addition to guard duty
A Home Guard organization will supplement the regular police force in times of domestic violence, such as riots, and other disturbances. It is only on such occasions that a large force is required to perform the duties which have hitherto fallen upon State militias. It is necessary or advisable, however, for the States to create a large military force^{not} to form a reserve for Federal troops inasmuch as such a reserve is already provided for and the training of such a military body would be an economic and military waste.

Home guards are in most states created by statutes, but when the legislature is not in session, the Governor and the State Council of Defense under the war powers often granted them by statute, usually can provide for a State constabulary or similar force either paid or voluntary, for the protection of private and public property within the State and for the quelling of riots and insurrections.

Statutes providing for such forces have been passed in 1917 in Iowa, Chapters 231 and 295 of Laws of 1917. Louisiana, Act. No. 8, Special Session July 1917. Maine, Chapters 274 and 278, Laws of 1917. Maryland, Chapter 26, Laws of 1917, Extra Session. Massachusetts, Chapter 43, Acts of 1917. Minnesota, Chapter 405, Laws of 1917. New York, Chapter 161, Laws of 1917. Pennsylvania, No. 347, Laws of 1917. Rhode Island, Chapter 1469.

Laws of 1917. Texas, Chapter 36, First called Session 1917. West Virginia, Chapter 9, Laws of 1917.

Statutes providing for Home Guards and similar bodies in the various States may be classified into five types according to the nature of the body created. First, are the strict State constabularies; second, Home Guards primarily for police duty which are approved of; third, Home Guards of the military type which are not approved of; fourth, forces of special constables, and fifth, a State secret service body.

A state constabulary or body of mounted military police has done very efficient work in law enforcement in Pennsylvania for several years. A similar body has been created in New York by Chapter 161 of the Laws of New York, 1917. These State police are all officers of the State at the head of which is a superintendent appointed by the Governor. In New York they consist of four troops each composed of one captain at an annual salary of \$1500.; one lieutenant at an annual salary of \$1500.; one first sergeant at an annual salary of \$1200.; certain lesser officers; and forty-five privates, the latter at annual salaries of \$900. each. The members of the force must be between the ages of 21 and 40 years, able to write and of sound physique. It is the duty of the State police to apprehend criminals and cooperate with local authorities. They have power to arrest without warrant any person committing a violation of the law within their presence and to execute other warrants properly issued, and to exercise all other powers of the peace officers of the State. An appropriation of \$500,000, was made for the activities of the State police. A volunteer State constabulary of over 500 men has been established in Rhode Island in 1917. These constables have all the powers of ordinary peace officers except the power to serve process. In Michigan there is a troop consisting of 250 picked men which supplements the

Michigan State troops, a Home Guard body who are constantly on duty. This organization is divided into five troops of three officers and fifty men each, three troops are mounted and the remaining two are equipped with armor cars, motorcycles and trucks. This permanent force has already justified its existence in putting down a riot in the mining district. Other units are engaged in guarding transportation and protection of munitions. In Pennsylvania by Act No. 347 of the Laws of 1917, apart from the regular State constabulary, the Governor is authorized to appoint and commission volunteer police officers. They have all powers of police officers, are specially organized and disciplined to suppress riots, preserve the peace and guard all industries and public buildings of the State. In California a Statute (Chapter 639, Laws of California, 1917) provides for three companies of twenty-five to one hundred men each at the Governor's discretion; members to be between thirty and fifty years of age. It is made the duty of these troops to perform all constabulary duties or other functions as the Governor shall direct, but they are not to be used in connection with industrial disputes. The officers of this body are commissioned by the Governor and are liberally paid, receiving so much per annum from \$1600. for a captain down to \$1080. for a private. An appropriation of a million dollars is made for this purpose.

In addition to such a State constabulary, if any, which will necessarily be a comparatively small body of men, there is needed to meet the situation caused by the withdrawal of the National Guard which was formerly available for strike duty, a Home Guard, which will have sufficient training and discipline to handle instances of domestic violence and yet will be in the nature of a volunteer organization. Such Home Guards have been formed in many States. They have the power, when created by statute, in practically all cases of constables or policemen except the power of executing civil process. In Louisiana the Governor is empowered by Statute under Act 8 of the Special Session of July 1917, to raise and maintain a body to be known as the Home Guard of Louisiana. This organization as in the case of practically all Home Guard organizations is not subject to service outside the State, and is not as an organization, subject to draft by the Federal Government. The Governor is commander in chief; prescribes conditions of enlistment and the composition of units; appoints officers; may dismiss them after hearings; provides for appointment and reduction of non-commissioned officers and fixes the pay and makes other regulations for the forces of which it is composed. These Home Guards have the powers of sheriffs, constables and policemen when called out at the request of parochial or municipal authorities, except of course, the service of civil process.

In Maine, a Home Guard organization has been provided for by Chapter 278 of the Laws of Maine, 1917. This is a voluntary organization filled by enlistment. The members are to be over 35 years of age and they have, as in the case of Louisiana, the power of constables except the service of civil process. A Home Guard very similar to the Louisiana one has recently been established by Statute in Mississippi, Chapter 427, Laws of Mississippi of 1917. The provisions as to organization and calling in to service are practically identical. The guards have the power of peace officers when called out by county or municipal authorities. The pay of the Home Guard in both States is not permitted to exceed the pay of the State militia when called into active service. Texas has provided for a Home Guard of a different type, see S. B. No. 8, Third called Session, 1917. Its organization is created on a county basis with the consent, and under the direction of the county court, or any county, being composed of citizens of such county over 21 years of age. The Home Guard thus formed is subject to the orders of the sheriff of the county, and may be called upon by him for active duty. On such occasion they may carry weapons. Drills are provided for and a military organization. It is provided that the maintenance of such Home Guard shall be without expense to the State, but that counties, cities and towns may make appropriations therefor.

Home Guards of the military type have been created in many States. They are in a sense a substitute militia taking the place of the National Guard which has been drafted into the Federal service. Many ideas, however, may be gained from the organization of the Home Guards in those States. They are to be found in Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.

Another type of Home Guard consists of peace officers appointed by the Governor or sheriff for special duty. In Iowa by Chapters 251 and 295 of the Laws of 1917, the Governor is empowered to appoint peace officers with the same powers as county sheriffs, who may make arrest with or without process. In Maine, special deputy sheriffs are provided for by Chapter 274 of the Laws of 1917. In Massachusetts, Chapter 43 of the General Acts of 1917, authorizes the Governor to appoint not over 300 special officers in the district police force for a period of two months at a time. They are paid \$3.50 per day, traveling expenses, and have the same powers as ordinary district police. In Minnesota, Chapter 405, Laws of Minnesota, 1917, the sheriff of any city of over three hundred thousand inhabitants has power to appoint any number of deputy sheriffs to protect life and property. They are to act without compensation. Chapter 9 of the Laws of West Virginia, 1917 gives powers to sheriffs to appoint from 10 to 100 deputies in each county for the period of the war.

In addition to State constabularies, Home Guards and special constables, a few States, notably New York, Chapter 525 of the Laws of 1917, have established a State secret service under the direction of the attorney general of the State.

In States where the legislature is not in session, the State constabulary and Home Guard might be established for the current year out of funds already appropriated, subject to continuance by the Legislature in its session of the succeeding year. Even apart from such power already granted by the Legislature to the Governor and the State Council of Defense, a Home Guard might be formed by the Governor and State Council of Defense in the absence of direct legislative authority as has been done in several States. In those States volunteer organizations have been formed, the volunteers taking the oath to obey the Governor and the officers he appoints. The guards in those cases must serve without pay and are frequently compelled to provide their own uniforms. Arms of course may be supplied by popular subscription or from private sources.

This method of volunteer organization has been pursued in Arizona. There a captain was chosen by the local Council of Defense and deputized by the sheriff. Men were divided into squads and a signal of alarm was arranged for reporting to the squad leader. In Michigan an excellent organization has been formed on a volunteer basis. It has been spoken of above. It consists of nearly 10,000 men, divided into about 125 companies. In addition to the general body of State troops there is a permanent force of 250 picked men, divided into 5 troops that has been formed. In Missouri, the Governor by proclamation asked the State Council to organize a Home Guard. The State Council in turn directed the county councils to perform the work. They secured the enrollment of companies and regiments, and elected temporary officers to control the temporary organizations, and report them to the Governor and Adjutant General to be commissioned when officially enrolled. In this way a body of at least 10,000 men was raised and a large fund formed for the support of the movement.

This method of volunteer organization is, however, naturally not nearly so efficient as more scientific organizations with State support and under authority delegated by the State legislature, and as has been said previously in this report, there seems no reason why ~~in~~, a State constabulary and a Home Guard could not be organized on the more systematic and permanent basis. To generalize as to organization, it appears to be most advantageous to make the Governor the head of the force and to authorize him, with the approval of the Adjutant General, to make regulations of various sorts for the organization and training of the Home Guards. The State Council of Defense may be used very effectively for organization purposes. The pay of the Home Guards is very small. They are usually called forth only in emergency and upon that occasion have the power of sheriffs, constables and police officers, except the service of civil process. They should be so called out only on authorization from the Governor or certain designated municipal or county authorities. In many States they are organized on a military basis; are given military drill, and are armed and uniformed. The uniform should be clearly distinguishable from that of the national troops.

The age limits vary with the States. In some States it has been provided that men within the draft ages, 21 to 31, shall not be eligible for service in the Home Guard, and further exception is made in some States of those who are exempt from the draft; but there seems no reason why men within the draft age should not be admissible to the Home Guard, provided that their withdrawal would not interrupt its work. The military training thus obtained by them would be beneficial to them when called into the Federal service. It is properly provided that such Home Guards should not be subject to service outside the State, or subject to draft as a body into the Federal Service, but that service in the Home Guard should not exempt individuals from draft by the Federal Government.

LSHAK/VS.

Outline by States

Creation, Organization and Powers

Compensation and Appropriation

A. State Constabularies

Michigan *

A troop of 250 picked men constantly on duty, divided into five troops, three officers and fifty men each, three troops are mounted and the remaining two are equipped with armor cars, motorcycles, and trucks.

This troop is supplementary to the Michigan Home Guard which is without legislative establishment.

New York *

Created by Act of April 11, 1917, Chapter 151, Laws of 1917. Headed by superintendent appointed by Governor. Ordinary powers of police officers of the State but shall not suppress rioting within a city except on order of the Governor or request of the Mayor of the city.

Superintendent \$5,000. Of the four troops the Captains each receive \$1500., the Lieutenants \$1500., and the Privates \$900. Appropriation \$300,000.

Pennsylvania *

This State constabulary has been established for a number of years. It resembles the New York constabulary.

Note: As this constabulary was established a number of years before 1917 we have no reference to the Statute establishing it. There is an article in one of the January issues, 1918 of the "Saturday Evening Post", on the work of all these State constabularies.

B. Home Guards Proper

Arizona *

Home Guards and rifle clubs were early organized on a local basis, the Captain being chosen by the local

The Home Guard is on a volunteer basis and is supported by private subscription.

Council of Defense and deputized by the sheriff. The men were divided into squads and a signal of alarm was arranged for reporting to the squad leader. Equipment was kept at home. The Home Guard has recently been re-organized by the Committee on Public Defense.

Arkansas X

Home Guard in the nature of vigilance committees. Sixty companies have been formed, part being uniformed and armed at their own expense.

California *

State Defense Guard, Chapter 689, Laws of 1917, headed by Governor and Adjutant General. Men between 30 and 50 years of age are eligible. Ten companies totalling from 250 to 1000 men are authorized. Duties of constabulary or other duties as Governor may direct, but not to be used in industrial disputes.

Compensation, Captains \$1600. Lieutenants \$1350. Sergeants \$1220. Corporals and Privates \$1080. Appropriation \$1,000,000.

Colorado X

Home Guards on county basis. 2139 reported in November 1917. 4000 shortly expected.

Same compensation as National Guard when on active duty. Such funds are available for the Home Guard as the Governor may deem necessary. By Chapter 378 counties and other local units may appropriate money.

Connecticut *

Established by Act of March 9, 1917, Chapters 32, 375 and 378. Headed by Governor and a Board of three members called the Emergency Board. Members of the unorganized militia are eligible. Constabulary duties and such others as the Governor and military Emergency Board shall direct.

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insert here

Georgia •

Home Guard or State constabulary established by law No. 224 of 1917. Headed by Governor as Commander in Chief and organized on a military basis.

The general appropriation of the Military Department is available upon warrant drawn by the Governor.

Idaho X

Home Guard. Four companies of 100 men each, reported planned.

Indiana X

Home Guard. Fifteen companies based on previous legislative authority of Governor to call out unorganized militia

Kansas X

Home Guards. Male citizens over 16 years of age eligible. Organized on military basis. Duties those of local peace officers and to suppress violence and insurrection at request of Governor.

Louisiana •

Established by Act No. 8 of the special session passed July 20, 1917. Headed by Governor, to be called out at request of parochial or municipal authorities. Men up to 60 years of age eligible. Powers of constables and policemen when on active duty.

Compensation to be fixed by the Governor, but not to be greater than that of the National Guard when on active duty. \$20,000. appropriated; \$40,000. for 1917 and \$40,000. for 1918. Also part of National Guard fund.

Maine •

Home Guard established by Chapter 278, passed April 7, 1917, to serve at the call of the Governor when required for the public safety, but not later than March 1, 1919. Men over 35 eligible. Powers of constables, police officers and watchmen except service of civil process.

Compensation to be the same as the National Guard.

Maryland -

Established by Chapter 26 of the Acts of 1917. State Guard, headed by Governor, not to exceed 1000 men. Organized by volunteer enlistment or draft.

Compensation not greater than the National Guard when in active service, to be paid out of regular appropriation for militia.

Michigan X

Home Guard formed under direction of Secretary of Michigan War Preparedness Board. In September 1917 reported to consist of 7,500 men divided into 110 companies. Supplemented by permanent force of Michigan State troops described above.

Minnesota X

Home Guard. Forty companies organized in 22 counties reported. Subject to Public Safety Commission by whose order they were organized.

These Home Guards are unpaid but they are allowed traveling expenses, except where they are in service more than five days.

Note: The whole organization depends on the broad powers and large fund given the Public Safety Commission by the Statute creating it.

Mississippi *

Chapter 42 of the Laws of 1917; headed by Governor; men between the ages of 18 and 60 eligible. Powers of sheriffs, constables and policemen except power to serve civil process. To be used to suppress tumult, insurrection and riot.

Same compensation as National Guard.

Missouri X

Home Guard organized by State Council of Defense through County Councils of Defense when requested by proclamation of Governor. 125 towns and cities reported organized, including 10,000 men.

Supported by private subscription; \$100,000. raised.

Nebraska X

Home Guard organized in cities.

Supported by popular subscription.

New Hampshire *

Established April 11, 1917 by Chapter 144 of the Laws of 1917. Headed by Governor and Emergency Board composed of three members for constabulary duty within the State. Anyone in the unorganized militia is eligible.

Compensation not greater than that of the National Guard when on active duty. Supported by such sums as the Governor and Emergency Board shall deem necessary.

Note: Chapter 166 of Laws of 1917 defines the powers of Home Guards doing guard duty.

New Jersey X

Organized on volunteer basis; divided into uniformed class and civilian class, the latter having only badges and performing local guard duty. Membership not to exceed 5 per cent of the population.

New Mexico X

Volunteer organization of automobile owners for guard duty. There is some talk of reorganizing the Home Guard in this State.

North Carolina X

Home Guard. Companies forming composed of from 25 to 50 picked men each.

Oklahoma X

Home Guards established by State Council in conjunction with Adjutant General.

Rhode Island *

Home Guard or volunteer State constabulary established by Chapter 1469 of the laws of 1917, based on authority given the Governor to be composed of able-bodied citizens to a number deemed necessary by the Governor. Powers of constables except service of process.

Compensation to be fixed by Governor and \$150,000 appropriated.

South Dakota X

State Council organized 27 companies of from 70 to 150 men each. Oath to support Governor taken. Officers commissioned by Governor.

Texas *

Established October 15, 1917 by Chapter 20 of the Third Called Session. Home Guard to be composed of citizens of county over 21 years of age, to be organized under direction of county court, subject to call by sheriff of county to preserve order.

Counties and towns authorized to appropriate money.

Virginia X

Home Guards organized on volunteer basis in 20 out of 100 counties.

Wisconsin X

Thirty-six companies of Home Guards formed under order of the Governor. Recruited by the Adjutant General of the State.

C. Military Home Guards

Illinois *

Established June 25, 1917, Chapter 782, Laws of 1917. Reserve Militia to be established by Governor and Adjutant General for the War Emergency when the National Guard was federalized. To execute State laws, prevent violation of threaten violation thereof, and suppress insurrection and riots. To be recruited from unorganized militia.

Compensation of \$1.00 a day for privates when in actual service. Compensation of officers same as in the National Guard. No appropriation, but cost of transportation and maintenance when in active service to be paid by State upon call from Governor.

Massachusetts *

Established by Chapter 148 of the General Acts of 1917. Governor Commander in Chief. Men over 35 years of age or below 35 if married and with dependents, or physically disqualified for Federal service eligible. Powers of constables, police officers and watchmen, except service of civil process.

Compensation same as National Guard, \$200,000. directly appropriated from the general appropriation of \$2,000,000. Also by Chapter 331 of the General Acts of 1917, \$250,000 is appropriated for the State Guards when on active duty.

New York I

Reserve Battalion for each regiment of the National Guard called into Federal service. 11,000 men reported in the New York Guard. Men between the ages of 16 and 64 are eligible. Classified into Class A those between 18 and 45, and Class B those between 45 and 64 and between 16 and 18.

Pennsylvania *

Established June 22, 1917, P.L. 628, Reserve Militia, headed by Governor. Established to take place of militia drafted into Federal service, for war emergency only, to be not more than 3 regiments of Infantry, and a Squadron of Cavalry, for military duty in case of riot, mob violence and tumult.

Compensation the same as the corresponding guard in the regular Army.

Washington I

Reserve Militia Regiment.

D. Volunteer Constables and Special Police

Iowa *

Established by Chapters 231 and 295 of Laws of 1917. Persons chosen by Governor or Attorney General empowered to make arrests with or without process, with the power of sheriffs of the various counties and to act as special peace officers.

Compensation to be fixed by Attorney General and Governor; \$75,000. appropriated.

Maine *

Established by Chapter 284, April 7, 1917. To have the power of special constables, police officers and watchmen, except service of civil process.

To receive same pay as State militia.

Maine *

Chapter 274, April 7, 1917 provides that special deputy sheriffs may

Compensation not to exceed \$3.50 a day.

be appointed by sheriffs from among male citizens more than 18 years of age, to have all the power of deputy sheriffs except service of civil process.

Minnesota •

Chapter 405, April 18, 1917 provides that sheriffs of counties with inhabitants over 300,000 in number appoint deputy sheriffs.

Compensation to be fixed by sheriff at request of County Board.

North Dakota X

Special policemen, deputy sheriffs, and deputy United States marshal created through the sheriffs by the State Council of Defense to act as Home Guards.

New York •

Chapter 651 of Laws of 1917. Provision is made for special police in New York city for the period of the war. Citizens are to be appointed to have power of peace officers, but not to be members of police force.

No compensation unless appropriated by aldermen.

Pennsylvania •

July 18, 1917, P.L. 1062, Governor authorized to commission volunteer police officers. Powers of police officers to arrest with or without civil process one committing a violation of the law within their view, to suppress riots and preserve the peace and guard industries and public buildings.

West Virginia •

Chapter 9, Second Extra Session, 1917, May 26, provides for from 10 to 100 deputy sheriffs in each county with the power of constables. Should be appointed by sheriffs.

Compensation \$3.00 a day while on active duty to be paid out of State Defense war funds.

E. Secret Service

Iowa *

Chapters 231 and 295 provide for organization of State Secret Service by Attorney General with approval of Governor.

\$75,000. is appropriated for this and other purposes.

New York *

Chapter 595 of Laws of 1917, Attorney General to create a Secret Service with the approval of the Governor.

Note: This report is complete so far as information has been furnished by State Councils of Defense.

* -- Based on Statute

X -- Organized on Volunteer Basis

Appendix B

THE MODEL STATE GUARD ACT

Section 1. Authority and Name. Whenever any part of the National Guard of this State is in active Federal service, the Governor is hereby authorized to organize and maintain within this State during such period, under such regulations as the Secretary of War of the United States may prescribe for discipline in training, such military forces as the Governor may deem necessary to defend this State. Such forces shall be composed of officers commissioned or assigned, and such able-bodied male citizens of the State as shall volunteer for service therein, supplemented, if necessary, by men of the _____ militia enrolled by draft or other wise as provided by law. Such forces shall be additional to and distinct from the National Guard and shall be known as the _____ State Guard. Such forces shall be uniformed.

Sec. 2. Organization; Rules and Regulations. The Governor is hereby authorized to prescribe rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this act governing the enlistment, organization, administration, equipment, maintenance, training and discipline of such forces: Provided, such rules and regulations, insofar as he deems practicable and desirable, shall conform to existing law governing and pertaining to the National Guard and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and shall prohibit the acceptance of gifts, donations, gratuities or anything of value by such forces or by any member of such forces from any individual, firm, association, or corporation by reason of such membership.

Note. -- Section 3 is not placed in the text. Except for the heading, "Pay and Allowances" this section is left blank, with the following note: (Insert here proper provisions for pay and allowance of officers and enlisted personnel.)" As the policies of the several States in respect to payment and allowances are expected to differ, no attempt is made by the model act to supply provisions.

Sec. 4. Requisitions; Armories; Other Buildings. For the use of such forces, the Governor is hereby authorized to requisition from the Secretary of War such arms and equipment as may be in possession of and

can be spared by the War Department; and to make available to such forces the facilities of State armories and their equipment and such other State premises and property as may be available.

Sec. 5. Use Without this State. Such forces shall not be required to serve outside the boundaries of this State except:

(a) Upon the request of the Governor of another State, the Governor of this State may, in his discretion, order any portion or all of such forces to assist the military or police forces of such other State who are actually engaged in defending such other State. Such forces may be recalled by the Governor at his discretion.

(b) Any organization, unit or detachment of such forces, upon order of the officer in immediate command thereof, may continue in fresh pursuit of insurrectionists, saboteurs, enemies or enemy forces beyond the borders of this State into another State until they are apprehended or captured by such organization, unit or detachment or until the military or police forces of the other State or the forces of the United States have had a reasonable opportunity to take up the pursuit or to apprehend or capture such persons: Provided, such other State shall have given authority by law for such pursuit by such forces of this State. Any such person who shall be apprehended or captured in such other State by an organization, unit or detachment of the forces of this State shall without unnecessary delay be surrendered to the military or police forces of the State in which he is taken or to the United States, but such surrender shall not constitute a waiver by this State of its right to extradite or prosecute such person for any crime committed in this State.

Sec. 6. Permission to Forces of Other States. Any military forces or organization, unit or detachment thereof, of another State who are in fresh pursuit of insurrectionists, saboteurs, enemies or enemy forces may continue such pursuit into this State until the military or police forces of this State or the forces of the United States have had a reasonable opportunity to take up the pursuit or to apprehend or capture such persons and are hereby authorized to arrest or capture such persons within this State while in fresh pursuit. Any such person who shall be captured or arrested by the military forces of such other State while in this State shall without unnecessary delay be surrendered to the military or police forces of this State to be dealt with according to law. This section shall not be construed so as to make unlawful any arrest in this State

which would otherwise be lawful, and nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the Uniform Act of the Fresh Pursuit of Criminals.

Sec. 7. Federal Service. Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing such forces, or any part thereof to be called, ordered or in any manner drafted, as such into the military service of the United States, but no person shall by reason of his enlistment or commission in any such forces be exempted from military service under any law of the United States.

Sec. 8. Civil Groups. No civil organization, society, club, post, order, fraternity, association, brotherhood, body, union, league, or other combination of persons or civil group shall be enlisted in such forces as an organization or unit.

Sec. 9. Disqualifications. No person shall be commissioned or enlisted in such forces who is not a citizen of the United States or who has been expelled or dishonorably discharged from any military or naval organization of this State, or of another State, or of the United States.

Sec. 10. Oath of Officers. The oath to be taken by officers commissioned in such forces shall be substantially in the form prescribed for officers of the National Guard, substituting the words "_____ State Guard" where necessary.

Sec. 11. Enlisted Men. No person shall be enlisted for more than one year, but such enlistment may be renewed. The oath to be taken upon enlistment in such forces shall be substantially in the form prescribed for enlisted men of the National Guard, substituting the words "_____ State Guard" where necessary.

Sec. 12. Articles of War; Freedom from Arrest; Jury Duty.

(a) Whenever such forces or any part thereof shall be ordered out for active service the Articles of War of the United States applicable to members of the National Guard of this State in relation to courts-martial, their jurisdiction and the limits of punishment and the rules and regulations prescribed thereunder shall be in full force and effect with respect to the _____ State Guard.

(b) No officer or enlisted man of such forces shall be arrested on any warrant, except for treason or felony, while going to, remaining at, or returning from a place where he is ordered to attend for military duty. Every officer and enlisted man of such forces shall, during his service therein, be exempt from service upon any posse comitatus and from jury duty.

Sec. 13. Severability. If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.

Sec. 14. Repeal. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

Sec. 15. Short Title. This act may be cited as the State Guard Act.

Sec. 16. Time of Taking Effect. This act shall take effect _____.

Appendix C
NATIONAL GUARD INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE*

- References:
- a. Report, War Department Civil Defense Board, Feb 1948
 - b. Report, Office of Civil Defense Planning, (Russell J. Hopley, Director, October 1, 1948).
 - c. Preliminary Study on Use of State Troops in Internal Security by National Guard Bureau Committee in Conjunction with Office of Provost Marshal General (January 7, 1949).
 - d. Comments by States on Plan for Internal Security Units.

I. The Problem

To determine the organization, develop a T/O&E, and prescribe personnel qualification standards, training requirements, and funds required to establish a National Guard Internal Security Force within the several States that will be capable of expanding, in time of a national emergency upon call of the Governors, and be prepared to assume the State mission of the National Guard.

II. Discussion

A. General. From a study of the problem, it is indicated that a Force capable of assuming the mission of Internal Security upon mobilization of the National Guard can be accomplished by several types of organizations.

1. A State Force, organized, equipped, trained, housed and financed by each State.

a. The following disadvantages to a State Force exist:

- (1) Most States will require legislation to create this Internal Security Force. Since most State legislatures are now in session, or have completed their biennial session, this procedure would require two to three years to accomplish.

* Submitted to Department of the Army by NGB, 25 May 1949. (File 324 - State Guard, General (1949), Box 1070, Record Group 319, WNRC.)

- (2) The cost of maintaining such a State Force as a separate entity would be prohibitive.
- (3) The States would be unable to procure the equipment and supplies required since the Federal Government now has priority on such items.
- (4) In order to provide adequate Internal Security, the Force must be uniformly organized, equipped and trained throughout the Nation, and it is apparent that it cannot be accomplished by individual States.

2. A Force formed on a cadre basis in time of peace as a part of the National Guard system, equipped and financed by the Federal Government; organized, trained, administered and housed by the States and Territories under laws and policies now in effect for the National Guard.

a. The advantage of this plan are as follows:

- (1) Insures a uniform organization among all the States, with like equipment and equal standards of training.
- (2) Distributes the cost, administration, procurement of personnel and housing between the State and Federal Government.
- (3) Can be implemented under existing laws and policies now in effect for the National Guard.
- (4) Uses facilities, and in peacetime uses equipment and instructors now being used by the National Guard.

B. Consideration was given to the need for engineer and medical battalions required in an emergency. The present concept of civil defense security envisions that these duties will be performed by the civilian defense organizations -- and therefore are not included in this plan. A small bomb disposal and chemical decontamination squad is included to be used to expedite any mission of the Internal Security Force.

III. Conclusions

A. General. It is the unanimous opinion of the Committee that the National Guard Internal Security Force should be established along the lines outlined in the following paragraphs:

1. The State adjutants general and their staffs should be the command echelon for the Internal Security Force within the respective States, and will be responsible for the organization, planning, training and administration of the Internal Security Force.

2. For the purpose of simplicity, economy, administration and tactical mobility, the Battalion should be the basic unit.

3. That the name finally selected for this Internal Security Force not infringe upon that of any established defense force such as the Military Police, or be called a Home Guard, but that such designation as "Internal Security Battalion" or "Internal Security Police" be used. It is felt by this Committee that the effectiveness of the organization will be influenced considerably by the designation given these units. In keeping with the thought of individuality in organization and designation of this Force, a standard insignia and shoulder "patch" of distinctive design should be prepared.

4. This Internal Security Force is part of the National Guard system, administered thru the several adjutant general, however, to function as planned, and due to its special Security mission, it should be organized independently of existing or planned National Guard units.

B. Specific.

1. Training:

a. A training program should be developed by the National Guard Bureau that will prepare the units and individuals of the Internal Security Force to function as contemplated.

b. These units should be attached to National Guard units for general and/or specialized training as is appropriate and consistent with its mission.

c. Armory drill periods and summer field training to be in accordance with training directives to be published by the National Guard Bureau.

2. Organization.

a. General. Upon acceptance of this plan by the respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, the following factors will have to be given consideration:

- (1) Regulations required to permit Federal recognition being given to Internal Security Forces composed of limited service personnel.
- (2) The necessity of formulating a publicity and information program to make acceptable to the local communities, an Internal Security Force.
- (3) That a plan for expansion of the Internal Security Forces in case of emergency should be developed by the adjutants general of the several States.
- (4) The problem of the Internal Security Force accepting Army jurisdiction upon induction into Federal service of the National Guard and of releasing such jurisdiction upon reorganization of the National Guard when released from Federal service.

b. Specific

- (1) The Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company should be organized to include specialized sections as required.
- (2) The Battalion should not exceed five (5) companies.
- (3) The "Standard Battalion" should be organized of one (1) Headquarters Company and three (3) Internal Security Companies.
- (4) Due to local characteristics and conditions, the States may necessarily vary from the Standard Battalion as warranted.
- (5) In view of the foregoing, there is attached hereto a T/O&E for the units recommended. (Not included.)
- (6) It is contemplated that in time of peace the cadres be organized, equipped, trained, and paid by the Federal Government on a basis comparable to the National Guard.
- (7) In event of a national emergency or in event a National emergency is imminent, the cadred unit should be expanded to full T/O&E strength, maintained,

trained and paid in a manner similar to the National Guard. However, it is believed that when this Force is employed on order of the State governors on State missions, the expense involved be borne by the State concerned.

3. Ordnance and Equipment

a. Due to the contemplated immediate use of this Force, it appears mandatory that T/O&E individual and organizational equipment other than cadre training equipment be available for issue at accessible centers located at depots as designated by the several governors.

b. Until such time as depots can be located and materiel made available to the Internal Security Force, the Department of the Army will earmark and set aside sufficient organization and individual equipment for such purpose.

4. Financial.

a. Funds for the implementation of an Internal Security Force should be appropriated by the Federal Government, and disbursed by the National Guard Bureau.

b. (a) The cost of pay for a single drill of the cadre of a standard Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company and a single Internal Security Company, considering established longevity, is given below:

(b) Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company

		<u>Base Pay</u>	<u>Drill</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Major	12 years	\$330.00	\$11.00	\$11.00
Captain	9	264.50	8.82	17.64
1st Lieutenant	6	220.00	7.33	7.33
Master Sergeant (1)	9	189.75	6.33	12.66
Sergeant 1st Cl (2)	6	148.50	4.95	14.85
Corporal (4)	3	105.00	3.50	3.50
PFC (5)	3	94.50	3.15	6.30
		TOTAL PER DRILL		\$73.28

Internal Security Company

Captain	1	\$8.82
Sergeant 1st Cl.	1	4.95
Sergeant	1	4.22
Corporal	1	3.50
PFC	1	3.15
TOTAL PER DRILL		\$24.64

(c) Total per Battalion Hq & Hq Co per drill	\$73.28
Total per Internal Security Co	24.64

IV. Recommendations

A. That the States be asked to accept the responsibility to organize, implement and train an Internal Security Force, thus establishing nationwide internal security, and that this Force be an integral part of the National Guard System, and further that the administration and control be through the National Guard Bureau.

B. That the Internal Security Force be organized as separate Battalions of the "Standard Type," as exhibited in the attached T/O&E, under the direct control of the adjutants general of the several States.

C. That the National Guard Bureau determine from the States and Territories the number of battalions they require at this time on a cadre basis for the Internal Security Force, and when the State requirements have been determined. Regulations be drafted providing a means for implementing the Internal Security Force as an integral part of the National Guard system.

D. That the National Guard Bureau determine from the Department of the Army the type of arms and other equipment which can be made available for both cadre and the full troop basis, and that this equipment be immediately earmarked and held in reserve for use of the Internal Security Force.

E. That a budget be prepared determining the initial cost of organizing and maintaining this Force during the first year of operation, and that Congress be called upon to appropriate this initial cost. Each year thereafter that an item be included in the annual National Guard Bureau for the Internal Security Force.

F. That the Internal Security cadres should devote every effort to the expeditious organizing and recruiting of their units, and that these units "stand" muster and inspection annually, for which pay will be authorized.

G. That the personnel of the Internal Security Force should be authorized to attend Service Schools on the same basis as the National Guard.

This committee was composed of National Guard officers as listed below:

Brig. Gen.	Frank B. De Lano	California
Colonel	Harlan D. Bynell	Minnesota
Colonel	Julius A. Stark	Ohio
Lt. Col.	Russel L. Kagarise	Pennsylvania

Appendix D

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bulk of the documents used for this report are in the files of the National Guard Bureau, now held principally in Record Groups 168 and 319 at the National Archives and the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. The annual reports of the Chief of the Militia Bureau for 1918-19 and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau for 1940-41, 1941-42, 1946 (covering the years 1942-46), 1946-47, 1950-51, 1951-52, and 1952-53 are in the Library of Congress. The Library of Congress also has reports of some state adjutants general.

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- Georgia, 1918.
- Idaho, 1917-18.
- Illinois, 1916-18.
- Kansas, 1917-18.
- Kentucky, 1922.
- Massachusetts, 1918.
- Mississippi, 1916-17.
- Missouri, 1917-20.
- Nebraska, 1917-18, 1919-20.
- New Jersey, 1916-18.
- North Carolina, 1917-18, 1919-20.
- Ohio, 1919.
- Oregon, November 1, 1916 to October 21, 1918.
- Rhode Island, 1917, 1918.
- South Carolina, 1918.
- South Dakota, 1917-18.
- Tennessee, 1919.
- Texas, 1917-18.

Utah, 1917-18.
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